

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

WEDNESDAY, MAY 22, 2013

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 8:58 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Durbin, Murray, Pryor, Cochran, Shelby, Collins, and Blunt.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

Senator DURBIN. Good morning. It's my pleasure to announce that the subcommittee is going to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2014 budget. I am pleased to welcome the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John McHugh, whom I first ran into when we served in the House of Representatives together on that political field of battle; and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, whom I first met in Iraq near an actual field of battle. So, battle tested, our witnesses are here today.

Thank you for coming to talk about the 2014 budget and a number of other issues. We're going to discuss during the course of this issues ranging from the impact of sequestration on the United States Army and the issue of sexual assault and its impact on the Army as well.

For fiscal year 2014, the President's budget request is \$129 billion in base funding for the Army, \$38.6 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO). These requests do not reflect implementation of a sequester, which is hitting the Army particularly hard in fiscal year 2013 and will be compounded if it has to absorb across-the-board cuts again in 2014.

General Odierno, you have stated that for fiscal year 2014 and beyond, sequestration may result in the loss of an additional 100,000 soldiers at a minimum from the Active Guard and Reserve components. You've warned these reductions will impact every base and installation in the Army, and that sequestration will result in

delays to modernization, the inability to reset equipment, and unacceptable reductions to unit and individual training. I understand your operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts are hit the hardest. Sequestration cuts O&M by \$4.6 billion in the last half of this fiscal year.

Secretary Hagel made a difficult but necessary announcement last week that civilian furloughs begin in July for 11 days to help offset sequester. On top of that, higher wartime operating costs could add \$8.3 billion to the shortfall expected before the end of the year. We received the omnibus reprogramming last Friday, which will provide some relief, but the Army still is projecting over \$3 billion in shortfall in OCO funding this year.

In addition to discussing the budget this morning, we are compelled to address the issue relating to sexual assault in the military. It was just over 2 weeks ago we learned an Air Force official in charge of sexual assault prevention was arrested for the very behavior he was charged with preventing. We learned last week that a soldier assigned to coordinate sexual assault prevention programs has also been charged with pandering, abusive sexual contact, assault and maltreatment of subordinates. On top of this, there is news of at least two different commanders overturning courts martial convictions for sexual assault, and an annual Defense Department survey that estimated a 35-percent increase in sexual assault between 2010 and 2012.

I know that none of the senior leadership in the Pentagon takes these matters lightly, but they have—unfortunately, these matters have shaken the trust that many have in the ability of our military to deal with this, and it's why this testimony is important. I look forward to hearing from you about what is being done and your recognition of the challenge that has been created.

There are many other issues to cover today as well, planned reductions in Army in-strength, troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, the strategic shift to the Pacific, modernization, suicide rates; the list is pretty lengthy. We sincerely appreciate both of you and your service to our Nation, and particularly to the men and women in our great United States Army. Thanks for your testimony this morning. Your full statements will be included in the record.

Let me turn to my colleagues for opening remarks. Senator Cochran.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to the hearing today. We appreciate the service you are rendering and the important roles you have in our United States Army. Looking to the Army for leadership among ground troops and positions around the world where we are strategically located with forces deployed under your command, it's an awesome responsibility, and we understand that you can't do it without the support of your Government and without the support of the Congress and funding the important pay and allowances, other benefits for our all-volunteer service. It's an interesting challenge for all of us to do that and stay within the budget guidelines that are laid before us during this next fiscal year. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Shelby.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to welcome the Secretary and the General back to the committee and look forward to hearing from them.

Senator DURBIN. Thanks very much.

Secretary McHugh, your full statement will be made part of the record. Please proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cochran, and Ranking Member of the full committee Shelby. It is an honor once again to be with you here this year. In respect to the available time, I'll try to truncate to some degree my remarks.

I would, before I turn to the very important items that the Chairman mentioned such as sequestration, the 2014 budget as submitted by the President, discuss perhaps the most fundamental challenge facing this Army today, and that is of sexual assault, sexual harassment.

I want to assure this committee of the Army's unwavering commitment to eliminating sexual assault and harassment in our ranks. These crimes violate virtually everything the Army stands for. They are counter to the core of Army values, and they will not be tolerated. Such behavior destroys trust, destroys cohesiveness and good order and discipline, and I want everyone in this Congress, everyone in this Nation, and most of all everyone in our Army ranks to rest assured that we are devoted to the prevention, protection, and where appropriate, the prosecution of these unacceptable acts.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, and as the rest of the committee is aware, in recent weeks we have seen several cases involving personnel allegedly committing the very acts they were assigned to prevent, and committed them against the very individuals they were supposed to protect. In working closely with the Department of Defense, we are aggressively retraining, re-vetting, and recertifying sexual assault response coordinators and unit victim advocates throughout the Army. But I want to be very clear: We know that this is just a step—a step in an ongoing effort to stamp out such abhorrent crimes.

We're making some progress. In some areas we're making good progress. But we will not rest until these acts are not tolerated by our culture and are not either perpetuated or accepted by our soldiers. We owe America's sons and daughters no less, and we look forward to partnering with you on this committee and throughout this Congress as we continue in this critical effort.

If I may now, let me turn to the state of our Army, and I want to put it very frankly. We find ourselves at a very dangerous crossroads. If we as a Nation choose the wrong path, it may severely damage our force, further reduce our readiness and hamper our national security, and do it for years to come.

As you gentlemen know, over the last 12 years this Nation has built the most combat ready, capable and lethal fighting force the

world has ever known. From Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa and Korea, we have fought America's enemies and protected our national interests, deterred would-be aggressors and supported our allies and our soldiers, and have done it with unprecedented skilled, determination, and I think undeniably results.

Unfortunately, today we face an unparalleled threat to our readiness, capabilities, and soldier and family programs. That danger comes from the uncertainty that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, caused by continuing sequestration, funding through repeated continuing resolutions, and significant shortfalls in overseas contingency accounts.

In fiscal year 2013, the blunt axe known as sequestration, which struck in the last half of the ongoing fiscal year, and was on top of the \$487 billion in Department-wide cuts that had already been imposed under the Budget Control Act (BCA), forced us to take extraordinary measures just to ensure that our war fighters had the support and the equipment they needed for the current fight. We made those hard decisions, but we did so at a heavy price to our civilian employees, to our training needs, maintenance requirements, readiness levels, and to a myriad of other vital programs that are necessary to sustain our force and develop it for the future.

For the Army, sequestration created an estimated shortfall of \$7.6 billion for the remaining 6 months of this fiscal year. This includes nearly \$5.5 billion in Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) accounts alone, and the impact of this drastic decline over such a short period will dramatically, directly and significantly impact the readiness of our Total Force. We have frozen hiring and released hundreds of temporary and term workers. We were forced to reduce training to the squad level for our non-deploying units and to cancel all but one of the remaining brigade decisive action rotations at our combat training centers, and this is on top of the drastic impacts to our depot, vehicle, and facility maintenance programs.

Unavoidably, these negative effects may well cascade into the next fiscal year and beyond. And to put it very simply, to continue sequestration into fiscal year 2014 and beyond would not only be irresponsible and devastating to the Force, but it would also directly hamper our ability to provide sufficiently trained and ready forces to protect our national interests.

Moreover, implementation through fiscal year 2021 will require even greater force reductions that will dramatically increase strategic risk. For example, just to maintain balance, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, and as the Chief has said in the past, we may have to reduce 100,000 additional personnel across all three components. When you couple those with the cuts driven already by the BCA, we could see the Army lose up to 200,000 soldiers just over the next 10 years.

As a result, to mitigate against continuing impacts of such indiscriminate reductions, our fiscal year budget request, as is true in both the House and Senate resolutions, does not reflect further sequestration cuts. Rather, we attempt to protect some of our most vital capabilities which were developed over nearly a dozen years of war, and to hedge against even further reductions in readiness.

We hope that if additional funding reductions are required, they can be properly back-loaded into later fiscal years and that, as such, we will be provided the time and flexibility to implement them as responsibly as possible.

For all its challenges, continued sequestration is only part of the danger we face. Since fiscal year 2010, the Army has experienced funding through some 15 different continuing resolutions. This has caused repeated disruptions in our modernization efforts, uncertainty in our contracts, and unpredictability for our industrial base. And there is more. While we remain at war with a determined enemy in Afghanistan, and we simultaneously are conducting retrograde operations, we must remember that OCO funding is essential.

Unfortunately, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, our Army currently faces some \$8 billion in deficit in overseas contingency funding, and assuming the \$5 billion in credited amounts in the reprogramming that was recently submitted goes through, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, that would leave still more than \$3 billion in shortfalls.

Although, as noted earlier, we will never allow our war fighters to suffer, these OCO shortfalls disrupt our ability to repair and reset equipment and directly impact our organic and commercial industrial bases. Continued budget uncertainty jeopardizes our ability to have the right forces with the right training and equipment in the right place to defend our Nation.

More than ever, as such, we need you, our strategic partners, to ensure that America's Army has the resources, tools and force structure necessary to meet our requirements at home and abroad. The Army's fiscal year 2014 budget request is designed to do just that. This submission meets our current operational requirements while allowing us to build an army to meet future challenges through prudently aligning force structure, readiness, and modernization against strategic risk. It also sustains our commitment to soldiers, civilians, and their family members, many of whom continue to deal with the wounds and illnesses and stresses of war.

From suicide prevention and prosecution, this budget is designed to strengthen, protect and preserve our Army family using those programs that are efficient, effective, and comprehensive. We have a sacred covenant with all who serve and with all who support them, and we must never break it.

Nevertheless, we recognize our Nation's fiscal reality. Accordingly, our budget proposal will further these goals with a 4-percent reduction from fiscal year 2013's budget base, and this will be achieved through prudent, well-planned reductions, not indiscriminate slashing.

PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of your Army, thank you again to the members of this great subcommittee and full committee for your thoughtful oversight, unwavering commitment, and proud partnership. With your support and continued leadership and guidance, the Army will remain what you have helped build, the finest land force in the history of the world. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH AND
GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

INTRODUCTION

The Army has been in a state of continuous war for the past 12 years, the longest in our Nation's history. More than 168,000 Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in nearly 150 countries worldwide. The global security environment points to further instability, and the Army remains a key guardian of our national security.

The Army's ability to perform this vital role, and field a ready and capable force that meets mission requirements, has been placed at risk by fiscal challenges in fiscal year 2013. The combined effects of funding reductions due to sequestration, the fiscal uncertainty of continuing resolutions and emerging shortfalls in Overseas Contingency Operations funding has significantly and rapidly degraded Army readiness, which will translate directly into fiscal year 2014 and beyond. This lack of predictability makes it difficult to address the posture of the Army in fiscal year 2014 with certainty and specificity. However, this document will address some of the potential long-term effects that fiscal uncertainty will have on the Army.

Landpower for the Nation

America's Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led fighting force in the world, providing a credible and capable instrument of national power. Army forces play a fundamental role in all but one of the missions specified by the defense strategic guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. The Army's ability to provide strategic landpower for the Nation makes it uniquely suited to meet these requirements. Army forces are tailorable and scalable to meet mission requirements. The Army's ability to rapidly deploy task organized forces, from company to corps level over extended distances, sustain them and deliver precise, discriminate results is unmatched. Highly ready, responsive and capable ground forces prevent conflict through deterrence, by shaping Combatant Commanders' operational environment and, when necessary, winning the Nation's wars.

MISSIONS OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

From "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense".

In all but one mission—maintain a nuclear deterrent—the Army is a vital contributor to the Joint Force:

- Counter terrorism and irregular warfare.
- Deter and defeat aggression.
- Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges.
- Counter weapons of mass destruction.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace.
- Operate effectively in space.
- Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.
- Provide a stabilizing presence.
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
- Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

Fiscal Challenges

The Budget Control Act of 2011 imposed caps on discretionary spending that required a \$487 billion reduction in planned defense spending over 10 years. As a result of these spending cuts and in line with the defense strategic guidance announced in January 2012, we are reducing Active Army end strength from a wartime high of about 570,000 to 490,000, the Army National Guard from 358,200 to 350,000, the Army Reserve from 206,000 to 205,000 and the Civilian workforce from 272,000 to 255,000 all by the end of fiscal year 2017. These reductions, which began in fiscal year 2012, represent a net loss of 106,000 Soldier and Civilian positions.


The implementation of sequestration in fiscal year 2013 created a significant shortfall in Army funding, estimated at \$7.6 billion for the remaining months of the fiscal year, which includes nearly \$5.5 billion in the Operation and Maintenance account for active and reserve component forces. We also face up to a \$8.3 billion shortfall in Overseas Contingency Operations funding due to increasing costs related to the war in Afghanistan. The sharp decline over a short period of time significantly impacts readiness which will cascade into the next fiscal year and beyond.

The President's Budget includes balanced deficit reduction proposals that allow Congress to replace and repeal the sequester-related reductions required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 through fiscal year 2021. In the absence of such an agreement, the Army may not be able to execute the current defense strategic guidance as planned. This may compel actions that break faith with our Soldiers, Civilians and Families. Full implementation of sequestration and its associated outyear budget cuts will require further force structure reductions that will greatly increase strategic risk. To maintain balance between force structure, readiness and modernization, the Army may have to reduce at least 100,000 additional personnel across the Total Force—the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. When coupled with previously planned cuts to end strength, the Army could lose up to 200,000 Soldiers over the next 10 years. If steep cuts are required in fiscal year 2014 and beyond, this will create imbalance and significantly compound risk. It will cause a disproportionate investment across manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization and procurement, challenging our ability to sustain appropriate readiness in the near term in support of our current defense strategy.

To some extent, the impact of spending reductions can be mitigated if funding is timely and predictable, and cuts are back-loaded, enabling the Army to plan, resource and manage the programs that yield a highly trained and ready force. Continued fiscal uncertainty, on the other hand, poses considerable risk to our ability to maintain a ready force. Each continuing resolution prevents new starts for needed programs, limits reprogramming actions, creates inefficiency and often results in wasteful funding for accounts that we no longer want or need. Resource predictability affords the Army the opportunity to plan and shape the Army's force for the future within identified budgetary constraints.

The fiscal year 2014 Budget is designed to meet current operational requirements and allows us to build an Army to meet our future needs by balancing force structure, readiness and modernization. It fully supports the Army's central role in the defense strategic guidance. The budget request funds balanced readiness across the Total Force while retaining agility and capacity. It supports reset and replacement of battle-damaged equipment, as well as modernization priorities. A 4 percent reduction from the fiscal year 2013 Base Budget request reflects the Army's acceptance of measured risk, accommodating a tightening fiscal environment.

SOLDIERS DEPLOYED AND FORWARD STATIONED



AMERICA'S ARMY TODAY

Beyond combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army conducts many missions worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well as within the United States in support of civil authorities. The Total Force provides the foundation for Joint operations. Demand for Army forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease. However, the requirement for strategic landpower capable of worldwide deployment will endure.

Operations Around the World

The Army has nearly 80,000 Soldiers currently committed to operations around the world—in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. Forward-stationed Army forces, in the Republic of Korea, Japan, Europe and elsewhere, provide Geographic Combatant Commands with an unparalleled capability to prevent conflict, shape the environment and, if necessary, win decisively. About 77,000 Soldiers are postured to support operations and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region. During 2012, these Soldiers participated in security cooperation engagements in 23 countries across the Pacific. Reductions to our force posture in Europe are underway, but a significant Army presence and commitment remains. Army forces in Europe remain a critical source of timely operational and logistical support for operations in other theaters, such as Southwest Asia and Africa. The long-term impacts of sequestration and the associated outyear reductions, particularly to force structure and readiness, threaten the Army's ability to provide trained and ready forces to perform these enduring and vital missions.

Operations in Afghanistan

The approximately 60,000 Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, in both conventional and special operations units, remain our top priority. The Army provides the corps-level headquarters that form the basic structures for conventional forces in the theater, and provides two division-level headquarters that control the majority of operational activities in the country. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force is built on a foundation of an Army Special Forces Group. The majority of combat units in theater are U.S. Army, and some of the most critical enablers such as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and route clearance units are almost exclusively U.S. Army. The critical transition to Afghan leadership in security is being enabled by thousands of Army NCOs, Officers and Soldiers who have been re-missioned to advise and assist the increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces. The Army also provides essential logistics capabilities that sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In fact, only the Army can provide the theater logistics, transportation, medical and communications infrastructure necessary to support operations of this size, complexity and duration. The Army has also begun the challenging task of equipment and materiel retrograde and refit from Afghanistan. It is a daunting task by virtue of the sheer volume of the equipment that must be brought home as well; this challenge is compounded by harsh geography, adverse weather and ongoing combat operations. Funding shortfalls threaten to further extend the timeline and increase overall costs.

Missions as a Member of the Joint Force

The Army provides a wide range of capabilities as an indispensable member of the Joint Force. Every day, the Army maintains deployable contingency forces, employs forward-based capabilities, delivers humanitarian assistance and conducts multilateral exercises with partners and allies. The Army maintains a Global Response Force at constant high readiness providing the Nation its only rapid response, inland forcible entry capability for unforeseen contingencies. Army forces set theaters for the Combatant Commanders maintaining constantly the critical logistical, communications, intelligence, medical and inland ground transportation infrastructure to support all plans and contingencies. We maintain partner relationships that ensure access to critical regions around the world. Army commanders and headquarters lead Joint Task Forces, plan operations and exercise mission command of units across the full range of military operations. Army units provide space, air and missile defense capabilities for the Joint Force. We build and operate the space and terrestrial communication networks that connect our own units, the Joint community, and interagency and multinational partners. Soldiers provide essential logistics infrastructure, delivering food, fuel, ammunition, materiel and medical support that sustain Joint operations ranging from combat to humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Army collects and analyzes the intelligence that informs our actions and measures our progress, and provides the majority of the forces in U.S. Special Operations Command.

Missions at Home and Support of Civil Authorities

The Total Force is prepared to defend the Homeland and routinely conducts critical Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. As this past year demonstrated through wildland fires, two major Hurricanes (Isaac and Sandy), floods in the heartland and multiple winter storm emergencies, the Army is always ready to respond to the call of its citizens. The Army does so by performing a wide range of complex tasks in support of civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters, includ-

ing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear incidents, and for counterdrug operations within each State, as well as along the approaches to the United States. After Hurricane Sandy struck the eastern United States, more than 22,000 active and reserve component Soldiers, which included over 10,000 Army National Guard Soldiers from 19 States, provided immediate and sustained relief. Army Corps of Engineers Soldiers and Civilians pumped more than 475 million gallons of water from the New York City subway system and all tunnels connecting Manhattan.

THE ARMY VISION

The Army is regionally engaged and globally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.

THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE

The Army for the future will feature regionally aligned and mission-tailored forces designed to respond to combatant commander requirements to prevent conflict, shape the strategic environment and, when necessary, win decisively. Maintaining credible strategic landpower requires the Army to continually assess and refine how we operate, manage our human capital and increase our capabilities, all while mitigating the effects of significant reductions in funding. We must exploit our advantages in some key areas such as leader development; strategic, operational and tactical mobility; command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) and logistics. As we transition over the next 5 to 10 years, this effort will be underpinned by a strong institutional Army. This institutional Army mans, trains, equips, deploys and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. It generates the concepts and doctrine that guides the way we operate. It runs the professional military education system, that provides our country unparalleled thinkers and leaders at the tactical operational and strategic levels. It recruits our Soldiers and prepares them for military service. It is the foundation upon which readiness is built, enabling the operational Army to provide landpower capability to the combatant commander. The institutional Army takes a deep look at the future strategic environment to formulate concepts and plans for the best mix of capabilities to meet the Nation's land warfare challenge—the right skills, right doctrine, right equipment and the right qualities in our adaptive leaders.

The Army must strike a balance between force structure, readiness and modernization, in a manner that is mindful of fiscal realities yet also provides the Nation with optimized but capable landpower. The decisions we have made in response to fiscal year 2013 budget reductions will have far reaching impacts on the Army. Clear priorities guided these decisions. All Soldiers meeting operational requirements—such as those deployed to Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Horn of Africa or forward stationed in the Republic of Korea—will be prepared and ready. We will fund programs related to Wounded Warrior care. Although we prioritized resources to ensure we could meet Global Response Force and deploying unit training requirements, the rest of the Army will experience significant training and sustainment shortfalls that will impact readiness this year and will be felt for years to come. The Army's ability to perform its missions, as directed in the defense strategic guidance, will inevitably be degraded.

Globally Responsive, Regionally Engaged Strategic Land Forces

Regional alignment will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities. Regionally aligned forces are drawn from the Total Force, which includes Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve capabilities. Aligned Corps and Divisions will provide Joint Task Force capability to every Geographic Combatant Command. Through regional alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural training. For example, 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, is aligned with U.S. Africa Command for fiscal year 2013. In support of U.S. Africa Command objectives, the brigade will conduct engagement activities in 34 African nations over the coming year.

Regionally aligned, mission tailored forces play an essential role in the defense strategic guidance, which rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining our commitment to partners in and around the Middle East. Lessening demand for forces in Afghanistan allows our aligned units in the Asia-Pacific theater to refocus on supporting U.S. Pacific Command's objectives. In addition, U.S. Army Pacific will be elevated to a four-star headquarters in 2013. I Corps, stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, is developing Joint Task Force command capability, which will provide a deployable headquarters that can meet contingencies across the full range of military operations. These initiatives will enhance the capability and responsiveness of our forces. However, the training shortfalls and readiness impacts of sequestration places the Army's ability to provide these critical capabilities at risk.

Training for Operational Adaptability

In recent years the Army has deliberately focused training on counterinsurgency and stability operations to support requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will build upon that expertise while transitioning to a more versatile Army, with operationally adaptable land forces that will take on a broader range of missions in support of the national defense strategy. Innovative training methods produce ready and responsive forces while optimizing our resources. Army units train at Combat Training Centers, while deployed and at home station. Live, virtual and constructive training enables Army commanders to conduct multi-echelon events in a complex environment at home station. The Army's Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), which has been incorporated by each of our three maneuver Combat Training Centers, creates a realistic training environment that includes Joint, Inter-agency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners against a wide range of opportunistic threats.

Sequestration has had an immediate impact on the Army's ability to train at every level—individual Soldier, Brigade Combat Team and deployable headquarters. We may be forced to cancel all but 2 of the remaining fiscal year 2013 brigade-level Decisive Action rotations at our Maneuver Combat Training Centers unless additional funds become available. Training in fiscal year 2014 and beyond remains at risk as well. With sequestration, the Army will not be able to fully train our Soldiers, whether through professional military education or collective unit training, in a way that enables them to operate successfully in a complex environment across the full range of military operations. The long-term readiness impacts of the resulting deficit in trained forces will jeopardize the Army's ability to meet war plan requirements.

People

The Soldiers of our all-volunteer force are the Army's greatest strategic asset. These professional men and women provide depth and versatility throughout the Total Force—the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. As the Army gets smaller, it becomes even more important that we retain and recruit only the highest quality Soldiers. With the support of Congress, we will maintain a military pay and benefits package—to include affordable, high-quality healthcare—that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of service while understanding our future fiscal environment. During 2012, 96 percent of the Army's recruits were high school graduates, exceeding the goal of 90 percent. The fiscal year 2012 active component recruiting effort produced the highest quality enlisted recruits in our history, based on test scores and waivers issued. We are also on track to sustain the high retention rate of the past 3 years. While the Army draws down, it is important that we do so at a pace that will allow us to continue to recruit and retain these high quality Soldiers. A precipitous drawdown, which may be necessary if sequestration and associated reductions in budgetary caps are fully implemented over the coming years, will have lasting impacts on the quality of the force.

The Army is committed to ensuring that female Soldiers are provided career opportunities that enable them to reach their highest potential while enhancing overall Army readiness. Over the last year, the Army opened more than 13,000 positions to women. In January 2013, the Department of Defense rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, thus enabling the elimination of unnecessary gender-based restrictions for assignment. The Army is currently developing, reviewing and validating occupational standards, with the aim of fully integrating women into occupational fields to the maximum extent possible. We are proceeding in a deliberate, measured and responsible way that preserves unit readiness, cohesion and morale.

Ready and Resilient

Caring for the Army means doing our best to prepare Soldiers, Civilians and Families for the rigors of Army life. The Army remains committed to providing Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with their service. We continue to review our investments and eliminate redundant and poor performing programs. The Army will make every effort to protect essential Army Family Programs, but they will be unavoidably affected by workforce reductions, cuts to base sustainment funding and the elimination of contracts.

The Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign enhances readiness for the Total Force by tailoring prevention and response measures to promote physical and mental fitness, emotional stability, personal growth and dignity and respect for all. An integral part of this campaign is the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program, which strengthens Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians by addressing physical, emotional, family, spiritual and social fitness collectively. Healthy Soldiers, Families and Civilians perform better, are more resilient and improve unit readiness.

The challenges associated with suicide directly affect the force. It is a complex phenomenon that reflects broader societal problems and defies easy solutions. To better understand psychological health issues, the Army has partnered with a number of agencies to assess mental health risk and help commanders effectively address this persistent problem. In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army is examining risk and resilience factors among Soldiers in the largest behavioral health study of its kind ever undertaken. The study will develop data-driven methods to reduce or prevent suicide behaviors and improve Soldiers' overall mental health. The objective is to identify the most important risk and protective factors, and then act on them. Programs that improve Soldier and Family access to care, while reducing stigma, are essential to our efforts. The Embedded Behavioral Health program, which is being established for all operational units in the Active Army, is a leading example of how we are redesigning behavioral health services to improve the care that our Soldiers receive.

The Army is committed to providing quality care for our wounded, ill and injured Soldiers and their Families. During 2012, six new warrior transition complexes were completed, which consist of barracks, administrative facilities and a Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Medical innovation and groundbreaking research in areas such as traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder are helping us improve the care we provide our wounded Soldiers. Our command climate must foster an environment in which Soldiers can seek assistance without stigma.

Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program

The Army continues to employ the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) to eliminate sexual assault and harassment within our ranks. Active and engaged leadership is central to helping the Army community understand that a climate that respects and grants dignity to every member of the Army family increases our combat readiness. The Army will reinforce a culture in our basic training units, our officer training courses and our operational units in which sexual harassment, sexual assault and hazing are not tolerated, and if they occur are dealt with rapidly and justly. We are adding 829 full-time military and civilian sexual assault response coordinators and victim advocates at the brigade level as well as 73 trainers, certifying those personnel, and executing more frequent command climate surveys in units. We have begun the hiring process for the 446 civilian positions.

The Army has increased emphasis on investigations, prosecutions and laboratory resources needed to effectively build cases in order to ensure each alleged incident is adequately investigated, and if found credible, prosecuted to the full extent of the law. All unrestricted sexual assault allegations are referred to the Criminal Investigation Division, where we have added four highly qualified expert criminal investigators and six expert military attorneys and 20 specially trained agents who pursue their investigations independent of the command. We have also hired 30 additional Lab Examiners. Our 20 Special Victim Prosecutors educate and support the victim and provide advice and counsel to the criminal investigators as well as commanders. Sequestration and associated civilian furloughs are likely to degrade aspects of our SHARP efforts, from slowing hiring actions, to delaying lab results which hinders our ability to provide resolution for victims.

Develop Adaptive Leaders

One of our greatest advantages is our officers and non-commissioned officers, and the Army's ability to provide strategic landpower depends on the quality of these leaders. While we can recruit and train Soldiers in relatively short order, the Army

cannot build leaders in a similar timeframe. Army leaders must be innovative, possess a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar, highly complex and dangerous environments and display an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. As we face an uncertain future with an uncertain level of resources, we must prudently commit to the one certain, high-payoff investment—our leaders. Training, education and experience are the pillars of our leader development strategy, and we have many initiatives underway to ensure we cultivate, manage and optimize the talent of our leaders. We are instituting a program to match personal history and informal skills to duty assignments. We are implementing and improving our 360-degree assessment programs for officers and are making 360-degree assessments prerequisites to assume command at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. We are dramatically increasing the opportunity for and emphasis on broadening experiences and have increased the number of fellowships for our officers in government, industry and academia. Cuts to institutional and unit training, due to sequestration, OCO budget shortfalls in fiscal year 2013 and continuing fiscal uncertainty, will degrade our ability to develop leaders and will have long-term impacts on the readiness of the force.

Equipment Modernization and Reset

As we prepare for the future, we will need to invest considerable time and resources to restore equipment used in combat operations to an acceptable level of readiness through reset operations, a combination of repair, replacement, recapitalization and transition. At the same time, other pressing modernization needs require attention and investment. The long-term nature of sequestration-related budget reductions puts each of the Army's investment priorities at risk. All acquisition priorities and many equipment modernization programs may face unanticipated schedule or cost impacts in the out years.

The Army will require Overseas Contingency Operations funding for equipment reset for 3 years after the last piece of equipment has been retrograded from Afghanistan. This funding will support the substantial workload required for equipment retrograde, induction and repair, a process that can take up to 3 years for some items such as crash and battle damaged aircraft. Fiscal year 2013 budget reductions have already placed the Army at a disadvantage, forcing the cancellation of depot maintenance that will delay required repairs and upgrades.

Organic and Commercial Industrial Base

The Army will deliberately draw down force and production levels to fulfill the strategic guidance we have received. Aware that the future may bring unexpected crises, we must retain the ability to regenerate capabilities quickly in response to unforeseen emergencies. It is critical that we find the right balance between our organic and the commercial industrial bases. The ability to reduce the industrial base in times of peace but surge as required remains essential to equipping the Army, the Joint Force, and, in many cases, our allies and coalition partners. The current fiscal environment threatens the retention of critical skill sets in our depots, arsenals and ammunition plants. Fiscal uncertainty in fiscal year 13 led to delays in awarding many new contracts. Industry also began laying off workers and postponed hiring actions due to the slowdown in funding.

Acquisition Reform

The Army continues to reform the way it develops and acquires services and materiel through a capability portfolio review process. This approach exposes redundancies and ensures that funds are properly programmed in accordance with Combatant Commanders' requests, wartime lessons learned, progressive readiness and affordability. The Army develops capabilities through Army research and development processes, collaborating with other Services, industry, academia and international partners to identify and harvest technologies suitable for transition to the force.

Modernization Strategy

The Army must maintain the technological edge over potential adversaries, enabling the force to prevail in all domains. The Army for the future requires capabilities that are versatile and tailorable, yet affordable and cost effective. The Army modernization effort goes beyond materiel and equipment solutions. It is a comprehensive strategy that includes doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel and facilities. The heart of the strategy is the use of mature technologies and incremental upgrades of existing equipment, while balancing research investments between evolutionary and disruptive technologies. The modernization strategy is also supported by a risk-based assessment to identify candidate capabilities for com-

plete divestiture. Divestiture decisions will reduce total costs and preserve our ability to sustain the force.

Soldier Systems

The centerpiece of the Army Modernization Strategy is the Soldier and the squad. The Soldier portfolio focuses on equipment vital for squad success and empowers and enables squads with improved lethality, protection and situational awareness. It also includes resources to develop leaders and train Soldiers to take advantage of new or improved capabilities. Planned improvements for dismounted Soldiers include a mission command system that allows Soldiers to see each other's positions, mark hazards collaboratively and access on-the-move broadband voice, data and video capabilities. This unprecedented situational awareness, coupled with the continued fielding of advanced sensors and lightweight small arms systems, will ensure that our Soldiers and squads remain the best in the world.

The Network and Investment in Cyber Capabilities

The Network, also known as LandWarNet, is critical to empowering our Soldiers. Our senior leaders and Soldiers must have the right information at the right time to make the decisions essential to mission success. Consequently, the Army is building a single, secure, standards-based, versatile network that connects Soldiers and their equipment to vital information and our Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners. It is critical that network modernization and sustainment efforts meet the ever-growing demand for tactical and business-related information and enterprise services in a timely manner and at an affordable cost.

Ensuring freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and protecting our information and the Network is a continuing Army priority. The Army must strengthen its cyber security and network defense by building secure and resilient network environments, providing greater situational awareness, expanding programs for ensuring compliance with information assurance policies and best practices, and increasing training for all technical and non-technical personnel. To ensure the Army can defeat adversaries in both land and cyber domains, a full range of cyberspace capabilities must be available in support of the combatant commander, including well-trained cyber warriors, cyberspace operational freedom and assured mission command. This will require investment not only in technology, but also in people and process improvement.

Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

The Army's top two vehicle modernization programs are the Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. As a replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Ground Combat Vehicle will accommodate a full nine-man infantry squad in a vehicle that features increased underbelly and ballistic protection with scalable armor that provides maximum mission flexibility. The Ground Combat Vehicle will also provide sufficient space and power to host the Army's advanced network, increasing the effectiveness of the vehicle in any threat environment. The Army is developing the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to fill capability gaps in the light wheeled vehicle fleet, carefully balancing payload, performance and protection. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle combines an increased level of protection with improved mobility and transportability. It is also the Army's first network-ready vehicle. Together, this integrated team of vehicles will be capable of dominating across the range of military operations and allow for incremental improvements.

CLOSING

The American people have learned time and again that they can trust their Army to protect our national interests at home and abroad. Over the past 12 years of conflict, our Army has proven itself in arguably the most difficult environment we have ever faced. Our leaders at every level have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, flexibility and adaptability. Our Soldiers have displayed mental and physical toughness and courage under fire. They have transformed the Army into the most versatile, agile, rapidly deployable and sustainable strategic land force in the world.

We live in an uncertain world, which often requires a military response to protect our national security interests. When that time comes, the Army must be ready to answer the Nation's call. We cannot take the readiness of the force for granted. Sequestration budget cuts, and continuing fiscal uncertainty, have placed us on the outer edge of acceptable risk for our future force. The Army must be capable of providing strategic landpower that can prevent conflict, shape the environment and win the Nation's wars. Preventing conflict demands presence, shaping the environment demands presence, restoring the peace demands presence, and more often than not, that presence proudly wears the uniform of an American Soldier.

2013 ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT SUBMISSION

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using section 521 reporting criteria. Unless otherwise indicated, the data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2012.

Section 517(b)(2)(A)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	Fiscal year 2011			Fiscal year 2012		
	Active component in reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²	Active component in reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²
Major	73 of 86	84.9	93.3	64 of 81	79	88.9
Lieutenant Colonel	6 of 11	54.5	86.8	8 of 12	66.7	82.7

¹ Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	Fiscal year 2011			Fiscal year 2012		
	Active component in reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²	Active component in reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²
Major	3 of 57	5.3	8.7	1 of 57	1.8	8
Lieutenant Colonel	0 of 10	3.5	1 of 10	10	8

¹ Below-the-zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers.—13,653 or 30.7 percent of which 422 were fiscal year 2012 accessions.

Army Reserve officers.—10,026 or 32 percent of which 698 were fiscal year 2012 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted.—63,567 or 20 percent of which 1,644 were fiscal year 2012 accessions.

Army Reserve enlisted.—36,175 or 24 percent of which 6,068 were fiscal year 2012 accessions.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In fiscal year 2012, there were five Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2012, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA to the Army Reserve.

In fiscal year 2012, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA the Secretary of the Army granted five waivers to the Army Reserve. The waiver provided one Soldier an opportunity to play a professional sport and complete service obligation. Waivers allowed four Soldiers to enter the Health Professionals Scholarship Program. All five Soldiers were appointed Reserve component officers.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In fiscal year 2012, there were no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2012, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRRA by a combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In fiscal year 2012, there were no graduates released early from an active-duty obligation.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active-duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

In fiscal year 2012, the ARNG recommended 2,183 commissioned officers for a position-vacancy promotion and the Senior Army Advisor, an active-duty officer, concurred with all those promotion actions. The ARNG also recommended 1,234 warrant officers for a position-vacancy promotion, and the Senior Army Advisor likewise concurred with all those promotion actions. Prior to fiscal year 2012, warrant officers were not required to go before Federal Recognition Boards for promotion. Therefore, the numbers of warrant officers have not previously been included in the response to this question.

In fiscal year 2012, the Army Reserve recommended 62 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 35.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In fiscal year 2012, the ARNG had a total of 14 Soldiers that received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted based on non-completion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) ("medical hold" or "medical hold-over" units); and non-completion of the Advanced Leader Course or Senior Leader Course due to deployment or training schedule constraints.

In fiscal year 2012, the Army Reserve had a total of 7 Soldiers eligible for promotion if recommended that received Warrior Leadership Course (WLC) military education waivers as a result of being deployed or assigned to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) (i.e. medical hold). The USAR saw a reduction in waivers due to the Department of the Army (DA), Army Leader Development Strategy that went into effect 1 October 2011. This policy discontinued waivers for the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC).

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Com-

mander, U.S. Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In fiscal year 2012, the ARNG had 83,728 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In fiscal year 2012, the Army Reserve had 55,639 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting. The population of "non-available" reflects 28 percent of the total USAR end strength: 14 percent do not meet medical readiness standards (e.g., profile, pending medical review boards, adjudication) and 14 percent do not meet administrative requirements (e.g., initial entry training; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation; family-care plan, or Lautenberg Amendment restriction). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

A total of 65 ARNG Soldiers, with at least 24 months time in ARNG, were losses in fiscal year 2012 due to lack of minimum required military education. The breakdown is 19 enlisted and 46 officers.

In fiscal year 2012, the USAR discharged 32 officers and 7 enlisted Soldiers for not completing the required initial entry training required for deployment within 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In fiscal year 2012, there were no waivers granted Secretary of the Army to the Army National Guard under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of NGCRRA described in paragraph (9).

In fiscal year 2012, The Chief, Army Reserve, granted 210 waivers. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were categorized as Hardship, Medical or Administrative (i.e. Failed Height/Weight Standards, Failed to obtain Driver License, Accepted ROTC Scholarship, Temporary Disqualified, and Failed to Complete High School).

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In fiscal year 2012, 297,515 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,233 (4.8 percent of the Soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In fiscal year 2012, 160,864 USAR Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). These PHAs identified 10,879 (6.7 percent) soldiers for further review due to condition-limiting profiles (temporary or permanent) or failure to meet retention standards. The USAR expects temporary disqualifications to return to duty/deployable status upon resolution of the limiting condition.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In fiscal year 2012, the ARNG transferred all 14,233 Soldiers to a medically non-deployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In fiscal year 2012, the Army Reserve identified a total of 7,696 Soldiers through PHAs or other field generated source (medical commands) as having a permanent non-deployable medical condition. These Soldiers are being vetted through a medical evaluation board or a non-duty related physical evaluation board for final determination.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.


Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

USAR Training Strategy IAW the Army Training Strategy executes the progressive training ARFORGEN model (Reset, Train/Ready 1, Train/Ready 2, Train/Ready 3, Available) over a 5-year cycle. The training proficiency achieved at the end of year 3 (Train/Ready) is contingent on Allocated or Apportioned designation.

Effective 1 January 2012, the Secretary of the Army implemented 9-months “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) for the Army. Under this policy USAR units are mobilized for 12 months with 9 months BOG and up to 90 days of post-mobilization training. This allowed the USAR to reduce the training demand on their allocated units while in a pre-mobilization status. For allocated units, the bulk of individual skills training are a pre-mobilization requirement consisting of 24 days of Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Collective training is conducted during 15 days of Annual Training (AT). USAR units will mobilize at no less than a T3 rating and deploy at T2. First Army assumed the training for Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT) on 1 October, 2012.

The USAR generates apportioned units to execute contingency missions, Operational Plans (OPLANS), or other Army requirements during the available year of the ARFORGEN cycle. The USAR is required to provide 26,284 soldiers to the Available Force Pool annually. During a surge requirement the USAR must be able to provide 19,780 (75 percent) of its total requirement within the first 45 days and 25,881 (98 percent) within 60 days. The demand for apportioned units within the first 60 days precludes pre-deployment training to achieve deployment readiness after mobilization. The graphic below demonstrates precisely why the Army Reserve must maintain T2 levels of readiness for USAR apportioned formations. The USAR training strategy produces T2 units at the start of the Available Year.



The number of pre-mobilization training days required to train Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) units is based on the complexity of the training to achieve T2. The USAR established three levels of training complexity based on the resources required to achieve readiness objectives.

—*Level 1.*—Most difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days—T/R 2&3. Ex: Signal Command, Theater Military Police Command, Combat Support Brigade.

—*Level 2.*—Moderately difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days—T/R3. Ex: Transportation Battalion, Military Police Battalion.

—*Level 3.*—Least difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks and unit complexity; no additional days required. Ex: Airfield Operations Detachments, Medical and Dental Companies.

The Army Reserve has internal training support assets to meet collective training and mission command training requirements. The 84th Training Command (Unit Readiness) is the Army Reserve's Executive Agent for planning, coordinating, and conducting Warrior Exercises (WAREX) and Combat Support Training Exercises (CSTX) rotations. The command's training support brigades and battalions provide Observer, Controller/Trainer coverage for WAREXs and CSTXs. The 75th Training Division (Mission Command) advises, assists, and trains battalion and higher staffs in Mission Command. They provide exercise leadership and certified Observer, Controller/Trainers. They focus on developing the exercise architecture by replicating operational environments that facilitate Mission Command training; integrate Live/Virtual/Constructive-Gaming (LVC-G) design and simulations capabilities into seamless exercises that facilitate achievement of training objectives. Training is supported by First Army.

Timely alert for mobilizations—at least 1 year prior—is crucial to the Army National Guard's mission success. Under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, many training tasks previously conducted during the post-mobilization phase now occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for Reserve Component conventional forces. First Army, in theater, conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units waiting to deploy.

Army National Guard training and Army Reserve training complies with the ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multiyear cycles and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and available). Training progresses through these force pools with the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrat-

ing to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the Ready year.

All ARNG units are “Combat Units.” Forces Command Pre-Deployment Training, in support of Combatant Commands’ guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:

—Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB).

—CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel off a COB/FOB for short durations.

—CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB.

—CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as Brigade Combat Teams).


The pre-mobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A unit’s post-mobilization training time depends on the number of the pre-mobilization tasks completed during pre-mobilization. Army goals for post-mobilization training for Reserve Component headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of the unit (note: this time does not include administrative and travel days). Any pre-mobilization tasks not completed during the pre-mobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization station. The ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station with a pre-mobilization task completion rate of 90–95 percent. Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station 100 percent complete.

Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of:

- theater orientation;
- rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training;
- counterinsurgency operations;
- counter-improvised-explosive-device training;
- convoy live-fire exercises;
- completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period.

Post-mobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50–65 training at mobilization station. This training supports a Combat Training Center culminating training event during post-mobilization CAT 4 unit is required to perform in order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center; 30 day training exercises).

Below is an outline depicting post-mobilization training day goals for various units:



The following outline depicts the actual number of post-mobilization training days for various units:*

	Postmobilization training days		
	Current	Goal	Delta
V/H/S Brigade Combat Team	63	45	18
Combat Aviation Brigade	33	60	-27
Military Police (Internment/Resettlement)	27	40	-3
Engineer Battalion (Route Clearance)	37	40	-3
Military Police Company	30	40	-10
Quartermaster Company	23	15	8
Engineer Company (Construction)	29	40	-11
Transportation Company (Heavy Equip Trans)	37	40	-3

* From First Army-approved Post-Mobilization Training Plans.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During fiscal year 2012, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs. During Army Training Summit III the ARNG-TRS/TRC branches participated in working groups with Department of the Army Management Office Training Support (DAMO-TRS), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Training Support Command (ATSC-STIDD) and other Major Commands to develop an ARFORGEN resourced training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with current Event Matrix Menu and ARFORGEN cycles for all components.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) the ARNG is continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire Trainer—Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the geographical dispersion of units, the ARNG has a larger requirement for simulations that are Armory based. This brought the ARNG to develop and purchase the M-COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers and is fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the M2A2/A3 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS), Mobile Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (M-AGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.

The ARNG-TRS continues to participate in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to address the emerging requirement from the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC) to address the non-stabilized platform gunnery requirements. The ARNG has developed two solutions and updated those devices to meet the non-stabilized Gunnery requirements. The ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT) to train crew drills, convoy operations, command and control and non-stabilized platform gunnery. In addition, the ARNG has added an Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual gunners for .50 caliber, MK19, and M240 machine gun non-stabilized gunnery tasks listed in the forthcoming HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 147 IGT systems have been fielded to ARNG units with 80 more of the Brigade Combat Team solution.

The ARNG has bought down its requirement for 11 of the Non-Rated Crew Member Trainer for aviation crews using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding. This is an Army Program of Record (PoR) trainer that simulates training the aviation crew skills prior to live events.

The ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both the unit and institutional levels. This is a recognized "In Lieu Of" training device.

The ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements. In fiscal year 2012 they have bought down their requirements using NGREA funding. This system is a PoR marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) and phasing out systems that have concurrency issues. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. The ARMY is currently re-competing this contract and the

ARNG has a representative that is on the source selection committee to address the ARNG dispersion challenges and additional training requirements.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or non-pyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature effects. The ARNG has fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of which, 194 are non-pyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG training sites across 39 States and territories. They have received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life cycle sustainment as of 3rd Quarter fiscal year 2012. ARNG-TRS is continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based on the recently completed Army Training Summit III. The latest IEDES innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to support less than company size training scenarios that has started in 3d Quarter fiscal year 2012. The ARNG has restructured the Training Support section of the G-3 to address this issue and assigned an officer to manage the program of asymmetric warfare.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp Dodge, IA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and Fort Leavenworth, KS, with two additional sites for the future at Camp Gowen field/Orchard Range and Fort Chaffee. The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre-mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool defined as certified company proficiency with demonstrated battalion battle staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

The ARNG is also looking to procure their requirement of the Dismounted Soldier Training Suite to compliment the Close Combat Tactical Trainer.

The ARNG way-ahead is continuing to use PoR and seven recognized "In Lieu of" devices to train and sustain vital and perishable skill sets and interact with all components to support the live, virtual, constructive and gaming training strategy. The ARNG-TRS is drafting a white paper that will address a well-informed TADSS strategy that is ARFORGEN or Future Forces Generation (FUFORGEN) driven. TADSS are a key function of the ARNG training at home station and are heavily relied upon by commanders at all levels. In times of fiscal uncertainty the use of simulations becomes greater and critical to the readiness of the ARNG.

The USAR executes a training strategy committed to producing trained units and battle staffs for 21st Century operations that are prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commanders and other Army requirements. This requires realistic and comprehensive home station training supported by sufficient number of training man-days, and an appropriate mix of Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming platforms.

The USAR focused on maximizing simulation technology and home station training opportunities in support of commander's Force Generation training readiness objectives. Home station training capabilities must provide a training framework (operational, institutional, and self development) that approximates the conditions of the operational environment while mitigating resource constraints of land, manpower, facilities, and training dollars. The Army Reserve requires blended, integrated, and distributive training capabilities (software,

equipment, network capacity, and facilities) to train and educate more efficiently and effectively in support of ARFORGEN, the Army's Training Concept, the Army Learning Concept, and the Army Leader Development Strategy.

The USAR is currently conducting a pilot program which adds 10 laptops to 10 different USARC locations. These computers are being fielded for Distance Learning (DL) to support commanders in the field and allow Soldiers to meet mandatory DA Electronic Based Distributed Learning (EBDL), Distance Learning (DL), and other training requirements.

The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army Reserve's major collective training exercises conducted on Army Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and constructive environments to train senior battle staffs and to conduct company and platoon level lanes training. The Army Reserve has made sizable investments in improving facilities and infrastructure in order to leverage technologies to enhance training, reduce costs, and facilitate collaboration. The TADSS and Virtual Battle Space 2 (VGS2) systems have increased the readiness of units trained on them. Additionally, the 75th Mission Command Training Division has integrated a high-tech joint constructive battle staff training simulation to provide more realistic training to rotating soldiers. The next step for the USAR is to link Virtual, Constructive, and Live environments.

The USAR has fifty (50) Digital Training Facilities (DTFs), located in twenty-eight (28) States. Daily, our Soldiers conduct DL training on any of the 562 course, Structured Self Development, and individual or squad and platoon level collective training within these facilities. The Army Reserve is currently focused on using the VBS2 and distributed capability within these facilities as Spokes to the Reserve's five (5) Mission Command Training Centers (MCTCs) to conduct worldwide virtual and or constructive training.

The USAR has identified the Deployed Digital Training Campus (DDTC) as an effective portable capability to provide Gaming and Structured Self Development training to its units. In fiscal year 2012, the Army Reserve conducted an analysis to identify training gaps within the Pacific areas of American Samoa, Saipan and Guam. The Army Reserves will conduct a Proof of Principle (PoP) using the DDTC in American Samoa to enhance and improve the Soldiers' proficiency in Structured Self Development and individual, squad and platoon level proficiency. Additionally, VBS2 will be incorporated in Samoa, Guam and Saipan to supplement the current training and enhance training proficiency.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The States do not capture this data. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Army.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Army.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During fiscal year 2012, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 1,887 inspections of the Army National Guard.

Regular Army Officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the bulk of these inspections (1,833). Of the remaining, First Army and the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted 26 inspections, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and various external inspection agencies conducted 28. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two special assessments within the last 12 months. The first assessment was entitled "Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve" and was directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 11 August 2011. This assessment (Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve) was conducted 17 October 2011 through 26 January 2012. A total of 38 units were assessed as part of this assessment. The final report was approved in April 2012. The second assessment entitled "Special Assessment of the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) within the U.S. Army Reserve" was also directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 22 August 2012. This assessment began in October 2012 and is concurrently ongoing; the expected completion date is February 2013. To date, a total 30 of the 50 units selected for this assessment have been assessed by members of the Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General. The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General has also conducted 7 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections within the past 12 months. The overall goal of both assessments as well as the IO inspections was not to evaluate a unit's deployability status. However, out of the total 74 units assessed/inspected, nothing was found that would cause a unit to be listed as non-deployable. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active-duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

The Army continues to meet congressional intent as it pertains to active component (AC) support to reserve component (RC) readiness outlined in title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended. Every RC unit that deployed during fiscal year 2012 was properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment overseas and in the continental United States (CONUS) by processes associated with Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).

The legislated roles and responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of multiple associated AC division and above units continue to be executed by the commanders of First Army (FORSCOM's executive agent for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and mobilization of conventional RC units in the continental United States); the 196th Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) (for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the European Command's area of responsibility).

ARFORGEN continues to be the Army's core process to synchronize the progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR and other Army requirements. Within ARFORGEN, all active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units cycle through the ARFORGEN force pools and are designated either for deployment to a validated CCDR operational requirement or for the execution of a contingency mission, operational plan, or other validated Army requirement.

Assessments of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992) are executed and maintained by First Army, the 196th Infantry Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC units progress through the ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.

On September 4, 2012, the Secretary of the Army signed Army Directive 2012–08 (Army Total Force Policy). This policy establishes a framework for the integration of the Army’s Active and Reserve Components as a “Total Force” and includes general guidance on the integration of AC and RC forces for training, readiness, and employment. Implementation guidance is expected to be published in fiscal year 2013.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

	Title XI (fiscal year 2012) authorizations				Title XI (fiscal year 2012) assigned			
	Officers	Enlisted	Warrant officers	Total	Officers	Enlisted	Warrant officers	Total
U.S. Army Reserve	41	18	59	43	30	71
TRADOC	51	12	63	26	13	39
FORSCOM	1,033	2,165	101	3,299	869	2,108	87	3,064
USARPAC	30	49	1	80	25	46	1	72
Total	1,155	2,244	102	3,501	963	2,190	88	3,241

As of February 5, 2013, the Army had 3,241 active component Soldiers assigned to title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (Public Laws 108–767, section 515). Army G–1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of title XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by State—the chart above provides the best representation of how title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Odierno.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, CHIEF OF STAFF

General ODIERNO. Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cochran, Ranking Member Shelby from the full committee, other distinguished members, thank you for allowing us to be here. I am not going to repeat all of what the Secretary said. I just want to make sure that you know I fully support everything that the Secretary said.

But as a few points that I think are important: One, I want to thank the committee for the incredible support that they have given our young soldiers and their families, especially over the last 12 years, when they have had to sacrifice so much. You have ensured that we have the right capabilities and resources necessary for them to conduct the missions that we have asked them to conduct. So, thank you for that.

It is apparent to everyone that the Department of Defense, and specifically the Army, has a specific problem in combating sexual assault and sexual harassment. The Army has faced difficult tasks before and succeeded. It is imperative that we take on the fight against sexual assault and sexual harassment as our primary mission. The Secretary and I are committed to the safety and security of every soldier, civilian, and family member. Our profession is built on the bedrock of trust. Recent incidents of sexual assault and harassment further demonstrate that we have violated that trust, and we simply cannot tolerate this.

It is our duty and our obligation to create a climate and environment in which every person is able to thrive and achieve their full

potential. It is imperative that we protect victims' rights and show compassion for survivors. We must ensure that every case is thoroughly investigated and that appropriate action is taken.

It is imperative that we keep the chain of command fully engaged at every level. Command authority is the most critical mechanism of ensuring discipline and accountability, cohesion and the integrity of the force. Therefore, we must take a deliberate approach to implementing the necessary checks and balances that will ensure commanders and their legal advisors reinforce their mutual responsibilities to administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In this effort, we have much work to do. It is up to every one of us—civilian, soldier, general, officer to private—to solve this problem within our ranks. We must continue our dialogue and partnership with Congress about the best ways to get after this problem in our Army, in our military, and our society at large. We are dedicated to solving this problem.

Every day, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, I am humbled to represent 1.1 million soldiers, 266,000 Army civilians, and 1.4 million family members that represent the United States Army around the world. The Army's primary purpose remains steadfast, to win the Nation's wars. And as I sit here today, we have nearly 80,000 soldiers deployed: Almost 60,000 in Afghanistan, over 10,000 in Kuwait, and additional soldiers deployed to Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and elsewhere across the globe.

In the last 4 months alone, the Army has responded to several unforecasted contingencies by deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam, patriots to Turkey, and command-and-control elements to Jordan. Our soldiers, their families, and the American people are counting on us to ensure they are resourced to train to the highest standard and have well-maintained and capable equipment so that when needed, they will be successful while minimizing casualties. We cannot place this burden on the shoulders of our soldiers, civilians, and families. We owe them more than that.

In fiscal year 2013, the Army still faces more than \$13 billion in Operation and Maintenance Accounts shortfalls. This includes the \$5.5 billion reduction due to sequestration, and an \$8.3 billion shortfall in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) accounts. The emergency reprogramming action being considered by this committee would restore \$5 billion of the \$8.3 billion of OCO OMA shortfall. However, without any additional transfer authority of supplemental, the Army will be forced to fund the remaining \$3.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall from its already reduced base OMA account.

As a result of these cuts, we are taking the unfortunate step of furloughing our valuable civilian workforce for 11 days. We have curtailed training for 80 percent of the force. This means that only the forces who are next to deploy to Afghanistan and other operational commitments are conducting training. Therefore, our ability to respond to an unknown contingency is at an unprecedented level of risk.

The cost of these actions is clear. We are sacrificing our Army's future readiness to achieve reductions today in the remainder of

the fiscal year. It is in the best interest of our Army, the Department of Defense, and our national security to avert further cuts through sequestration. But it is not just the size of the cuts. It is the steepness of the cuts in the near term which makes it impossible to downsize the force in a deliberate, logical manner. These cuts will not allow us to sustain the appropriate balance of our end-strength, readiness, and modernization, and therefore will result in a hollow force.

Although I do not agree with the size of sequestration cuts, if we could backload the cuts, it would at least enable us to properly balance end-strength readiness and modernization in the out years.

In 1976, I entered a hollow Army that was rife with discipline issues, was not well-trained, and did not have the resources necessary to buy the equipment. I am absolutely focused on making sure I do not leave this Army in the same way that I came into it. It's up to us to ensure that we resource our men and women who have sacrificed so much with the proper resources to conduct the missions that we have asked them to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to the committee this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, General.

TRAINING AND READINESS

Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate not only your service to our Nation and the others who are with you, but the bravery and commitment of those who serve in all of our branches, and today we focus on the U.S. Army.

I was reading in preparation for this that—it was obvious, but it was expressed to me—the Army, our Army, has gone through the longest war in its history, and we are at a point now that it's coming to an end, and we have to make decisions relative to the future of that Army.

It was a sobering part of your testimony, General, to talk about the state of the Army in 1976 and what the state of the Army may be at this time, in 2014. I could not agree with you more that the sequestration cuts this year, if they are repeated again next year, will create a devastating impact on our military, and particularly on the Army because of its impact on the men and women who serve.

I recently had a nephew of mine who worked as a doorman here in the Senate for a few months before he was off to Afghanistan. He went with the Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, and we thought about Michael every day. We were hoping that there was enough training that he would be coming home to us safe and sound, and we counted on that, and he did. Thank God he did. Diminishing that training for any soldier is, unfortunately, a risk that that soldier may not be as well prepared as they should be if they are called on. So it is very personal and should be personal to all of us when we talk about this issue. It goes way beyond the numbers.

Let me mention a couple of other things.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT/SEXUAL ASSAULT

Secretary McHugh, thank you and General Odierno for focusing on the sexual harassment/sexual assault issue. As we read the troubling stories about those who have been charged with rooting out sexual harassment being found guilty of the same, it raises the question about the assignment, the responsibility given to these officers, and whether it is viewed as the responsibility that it is, whether it is viewed as a secondary assignment without much of a career path. Address that, if you will, in terms of how we are going to solve this problem.

Secretary McHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is something that I see as a critically important point. Indeed, it is something that the Chief and I and the other Service Secretaries and Chiefs talked with the President about a week ago tomorrow at a meeting at the White House, where he expressed his concern and his expectation that we will direct our every attention to this.

To your point, Mr. Chairman, and it was really the point of a message that the Chief and I sent just recently to all commanders that we expect commanders, first of all, to pick their very best. We don't have data on it, but I am concerned to this point that too many of these positions may have been filled in a way in which someone had an honorable record but was otherwise available. So they were assigned to these, what we believe to be, critically important positions.

Next, as we discussed with the President, there really is no reward to a soldier, as there are in other Military Occupation Specialties (MOSs) and other fields and occupations in the Army, for taking these assignments as a means by which to advance their career. So we have to incentivize it, not just to encourage commanders to pick their best but to ensure that soldiers who serve honorably and do what we expect of them will be duly recognized in appropriate ways. I have tasked the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to begin to work on, along with the G1, our personnel three-star, ways in which we could appropriately do that.

The other thing I think we have to do, Mr. Chairman, is look beyond the service record. Virtually all of the cases that you cited, to the extent we have the information thus far, including the Air Force example, as you mentioned, involved officers with, if not unblemished, awfully good records. And while that is an important part of the process of picking these individuals, I don't happen to think it is enough. I will sign a directive by the close of business tomorrow that will do several things.

One, to expand the records that we check to make sure that we are understanding the individual we are picking to the greatest extent possible, and that includes the conduct of a behavioral health examination, which right now is not done. We need to get behind the uniform to understand the kinds of people we are picking, and not everyone is suited for every job in the Army, and I believe not everyone is suited to do this job.

So incentivize the right people to do the best job they can, recognize them for that, and make sure we are giving commanders the tools to pick the very best and the most appropriate selections.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

ACQUISITION REFORM

I want to switch topics for a moment here. I am new to this chairmanship, and I am trying to learn, and it is a daunting task to educate a senator under most circumstances, and under these circumstances even more so. But I've got a good staff, and they have given me a lot of briefing materials to read.

I looked into the acquisition process in the branches of the military, and I think you are aware of the fact that the acquisition history in recent years has some troubling and expensive setbacks when it comes to the U.S. Army. Since 1990, the Army has terminated 22 major defense acquisition programs, costing the taxpayers billions of dollars. Following the submission of the Decker-Wagner report, you committed to implementing several recommendations. I would like to ask you: What you have done that has changed the acquisition process, and are there any tangible results?

I would preface it by saying that I asked some people who have much more experience in this field than I do when it comes to acquisitions why would the Army, of the major branches, have such trouble when it comes to acquisitions, and the explanation that came back to me was fairly straightforward. The Navy and the Air Force understand that the platforms are really the bedrock of what they offer in terms of military defense. The Army understands that the basic platform they deal with are the courageous and well-trained men and women, so they deal with the personnel side of it with more focus than platforms and perhaps have not developed the expertise they should.

So I open that question to you for a response.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, you do have a good staff. Those statistics came from the Decker-Wagner report, which the then-Chief of Staff of the Army and I—George Casey and I commissioned a little more than 3 years ago. The thing that was unsurprising about that report was how consistent it was with past reports. And we decided to do something rather unusual, and that is not just to read it but to implement its suggestions, and it had 76 suggestions or recommendations in total.

We examined those, along with our acquisition professionals, and adopted 63 of those. Currently, we have fully implemented 55. They are very important and yet very fundamental changes that were really required to avoid the kinds of problems that were cited in the Decker-Wagner report.

As we look back and do an autopsy, if you will, of past failures, there is no single reason, but there are some patterns. We would always allow ourselves to become too forward-thinking and began to rely on either totally undeveloped or immature technologies. That means you have to continue to pay for the development of that technology before you can even think about bringing it into whatever program you are thinking about. Future combat systems is probably a very good example of that.

The other is we wouldn't set definite milestones to the extent that, as development went along, we would keep moving the goalposts further and further. We always wanted to have the next best

thing, and that's understandable. But sometimes, in pursuit of fiscal prudence and to make sure you field an acquisition program, you have to say good enough is good enough.

And so if you look at the development of, say, the ground combat vehicle, our largest and, I think some would argue, our most important acquisition program and developmental project right now, we took those lessons to heart. We feel that our request for proposal in the first instance that had over 900 must-have requirements. And everyone sat back after it had been issued and said, "You know, here we go again." It was a hard thing to do, but our ASOL folks pulled that RFP back, reconfigured it, redeveloped it, made tradeoffs available to the various developers and reduced the must-have requirements to less than 200. That will save time, we estimate many months, but it will also save money, perhaps as much as \$2.5 billion.

So we have tried to learn the lessons. We have adopted the vast majority of Decker-Wagner. We will implement the remaining. Most of those have to do with personnel, which right now we are constrained from bringing on board.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, I had a few points on that.

Senator DURBIN. Sure.

General ODIERNO. First, we do acknowledge everything that you just said. The Secretary went through the Decker-Wagner report. There are a few other points I would like to make.

First, he touched a little bit on requirements, and I think for us, that is where we have made the most advancement—where we now do capability portfolio reviews that look at the requirements on the system, do they make sense, are they achievable through the technology that is available, and then we also make sure that we have room to develop and increment improvements over time.

I always use the example of the M1 tank, which was developed a very long time ago. But the difference with the M1 tank is what was built into the M1 tank was the ability to incrementally improve the tank. So today, it is still the best tank in the world even though the first one was built 30 years ago, and it's because we were able to implement and continue to upgrade with technology improvements. So that is a key piece to our strategy as we go ahead.

The other thing is how do we leverage commercial technology, specifically in IT. We now have what we call NIE and a system that enables contractors to come and immediately put into our soldiers' hands technology improvements in IT which allows us to test it and then allows us to incrementally improve our IT capabilities. That's a change.

So those two things, that with long developmental items, to make sure we have the requirements right, to make sure we constantly review them and look at them. We build in room to grow in our program. The second is let's leverage commercial technology where they are moving much faster than we will ever be able to move and figure out how we implement into that program. I think those are the two fundamental pieces that we're focused on as we move forward.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to yield to Senator Shelby, who was here before I was.

Senator SHELBY. That's okay, you go ahead.

TRAINING STRATEGIES AND FACILITIES

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, and welcome to the committee. We appreciate your service and your leadership of our United States Army.

We are pleased in our State to have training facilities in the Hattiesburg area, Camp Shelby, where I guess the realistic heat of the summer is something that equips against shock to how hot it can get during training and combat activities.

What is your situation with training facilities now around the United States? Do you find that you are doing more and more training here, or are there opportunities for overseas deployments in areas where you can also conduct training? What's the balance that we have for our own U.S.-based training facilities compared with other locations?

General ODIERNO. So, Senator, so we have a couple of different strategies. First, we have home-station training strategies for the Active component which enables them to use facilities around their home station in order to do a certain level of training.

Then we developed training centers around the country. We have the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. We have the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. We have Camp Shelby. We have Atterbury. That allows us to train both our Active Guard and Reserve units at a higher level, more integrated training.

We also have the training center in Grafenwohr, Germany, where we do training with our international partners, specifically our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other European allies, which has come in very handy as we have fought together in Afghanistan. Those are key pieces of our training strategy, to sustain those, because that allows us to train our soldiers to the highest quality in the most difficult conditions, and that's what's been so concerning, is that we have had to cancel seven of those rotations this year. So they have not had the opportunity to get that experience.

We actually use these training areas as certifications for the brigade level units so they are certified to conduct—whether it be a general requirement to meet Op plan requirements in Korea or other places around the world, or whether it be to potentially train on stability and counterinsurgency operations, depending on what their mission might be. So it is concerning to us that we are losing this because it is fundamental to the readiness of the Army.

PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST

Senator COCHRAN. Well, is this reflected in the budget request? Are you including in your budget request to the Congress the funding that you need to bring these facilities to the level you need to have a well-trained military force?

General ODIERNO. We believe that we are including what we need in order to train in this budget currently. Are there some military construction shortfalls potentially? We think we have the

best training facilities in the world. So what we are in the process of doing is sustaining that, and then we have to make sure we maintain the money so we have the readiness dollars for the units to actually go and use these facilities.

Secretary MCHUGH. If I may, too, just to fill that picture out, while the budget proposal that the President sent to the Hill does, as the Chief said, meet that need, it does not include sequestration which, absent some action, is the law of the land. We hope that this Congress can find a way to work through that, whether it is, as the Chief mentioned, and I did in our opening statements, back-loading them into the later fiscal years or, if we all had our wish, eliminating sequestration. But if we have to revert to sequestration in 2014, then those training exercises again become a matter of grave concern for us.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLE DIVESTITURE

I understand the Army plans to either mothball or whatever you call it when you divest yourself of vehicles, to divest itself of 13,000 mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles and only keep 4,000 for training and future requirements. I wonder if you've had any opportunity to discuss alternatives with any of our Members of Congress or figure out a way to respond to contingencies in North Africa or the Middle East or wherever the need may arise for the deployment of additional vehicles.

General ODIERNO. Senator, we have 21,000 MRAPs today in our inventory. We are going to put, as you said, approximately 4,000 into our units. We're going to put another 4,000 into what we call Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) in case we need them for other contingencies.

The other thing this is allowing us to do, we have about 10 variants. First, I want to thank Congress for everything they did to get this done so quickly. But because of that, we had about 10 variants, which is very expensive to sustain and maintain. We can get it down to three variants. So we go down to 8,000, we get it to three variants. We will keep 4,000, which is a couple of brigades worth, two to three brigades worth of capability that they will be able to pull out and use, and then we will also integrate some of those into our current formations.

So we think it is the best use of what is left of our MRAP fleet. We can't afford to sustain 21,000 MRAPs because it would be in addition to all the other equipment that we have to sustain. We think that by keeping 8,000 of them, we can fund that, we can sustain that. It gives us the potential to use it on contingencies. It also fills some holes in our current force.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS

General, I want to pick up on a little of what Senator Cochran was getting at. Could you describe the impact for the committee that sequestration has had on the quality of training that is provided for our soldiers that are new to the Army? I guess my basic

question is: Has the Army had to modify because of sequestration any training requirements for new soldiers, either attending basic or advanced individual training? And if not, you are going to be confronted with some challenges, are you not?

General ODIERNO. Senator, the Secretary and I have made a decision that we will continue to fully fund basic entry training for our soldiers, both basic training and then Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Now, this year there were some questions about do we have enough flying hours to train our initial pilots. We had to make some other tradeoffs, but we now have provided the dollars necessary to ensure that we don't have a backlog of pilots at Fort Rucker, because if we did, it is problematic because it is very difficult to catch up now.

If we go into full sequestration, it's going to impact our flying hour program. It won't impact basic and AIT training, but it's going to start to impact our ability and the number of pilots that we will be able to train, which we think will probably not be enough.

Where sequestration comes in is in the operational training force. That is where we are really going to be hurting. That gets back to what Senator Cochran said.

Senator SHELBY. But basically, if we look at our fighting forces now and in the future, we can't afford, can we, as a Nation to short-change our training, our future officers, enlisted people, equipment, anything, can we, General?

General ODIERNO. We cannot, sir. It is abstract to some people, but the cost is in lives. That is ultimately what the cost ends up being.

STRYKER HULL PROCUREMENT

Senator SHELBY. Secretary McHugh, the Double V-Hull Stryker was quickly developed, I understand, tested and fielded in response to the needs of our commanders in Afghanistan to improve survivability of the Stryker vehicle against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has found the Double V-Hull (DVH) Stryker to be operationally effective and operationally suitable and, most importantly, according to them, it has greatly improved soldiers' survivability.

It is my understanding that the Army now has a requirement to procure Double V-Hull Strykers for a third brigade combat team. When does the Army anticipate it will act on this requirement, and when can soldiers expect to start seeing additional Double V-Hull Strykers in the field?

Secretary MCHUGH. That takes us back to the issue we've been discussing repeatedly here, and that is availability of money.

Senator SHELBY. Sure.

Secretary MCHUGH. We see both the Double V—and you are absolutely right, the assessment coming back almost daily from Afghanistan is how much the soldiers value this. We have had some tragedies and, in fact, one recent one. But by and large, it has performed magnificently, and we want to make sure we are capturing that lesson learned and go forward by recapping and converting into the Double V-Hull.

We will also have a continuing need operationally for our flat, single-hull Humvees. They will be a part of the United States Army for some time to come. But as to the third set that you are talking about, I believe it was in 2014. But again, that is dependent upon funding streams.

DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND SYSTEM, ARMY

Senator SHELBY. So many things go right to the economics, do they not?

Mr. Secretary, it's my understanding that the Distributed Common Ground System, Army (DCGS-A) is the Army program of record for intelligence data analysis sharing and collaboration. In the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2012 annual report issued last December, the DCGS-A was found to be not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not survivable against cyber attacks. While I understand that prior to full deployment decision, DOT found that Release 1 of DCGS-A capabilities "were at least as good as those provided by the current fielded versions," the issue of survivability against cyber attacks was not addressed in their memorandum.

Could you provide an update to the subcommittee on the current status of the survivability of the DCGS-A against cyber attacks? Additionally, it is my understanding that due to the large bandwidth requirements of DCGS-A, soldiers deployed in forward operating bases in Afghanistan are having difficulty using the system. One, are you aware of the bandwidth issue, and what is the timeframe that you have for resolving this? And how important is this?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, it's very important, and certainly the Chief, particularly given his time in theater, could explain far better than I as to the critical nature of having the broadest possible input of intelligence sources that you can possibly gain, providing better information to the war fighters.

As to DCGS-A, I think it is important to note the comments that DOT&E made were made about 2 years ago, and really the concerns that were registered applied to one enclave of DCGS-A. It applied only to the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI), the highest level. The refinements and the improvements that have been made since, particularly to the less than TSSCI enclaves, applied to more than 90 percent of the intelligence transactions that DCGS-A involves itself in. As you noted, after re-examination, the DOT&E determined that this was an appropriate fielding.

I have been to Fort Belvoir. I have seen the DCGS-A demonstrated. It is an enormously capable and an enormously important capability. But as you noted, for some of the more forward deployed troops, there are other systems that are off-the-shelf commercial systems that we are very interested in. But the problem that they have is they provide a very narrow band of information, intelligence sourcing, but they do provide an ease of use that, in fact, has caused the Army to partner in what's called a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA), a research and development agreement with the commercial supplier to try to make sure that we have that ease of use and the link analysis capabilities that that brings to the field.

But DCGS-A is an essential part of our intelligence network, and like all programs of this nature, its exposure to electromagnetic pulse and other kinds of attacks is of concern to us, and we continue to try to work through those.

Senator SHELBY. General, do you have any comments?

General ODIERNO. Yes, thanks. First, as the Secretary of the Army said, later, the DOT&E in December 2012 said, "Okay, we have improved everything that they said, and we have either mitigated it or have, in fact, improved those deficiencies." But a couple of other things I would just say.

The DCGS-A has fundamentally changed how we do intelligence. I made a comment a few weeks ago that when I was a division commander in 2003 in Iraq, I had less intelligence than we now get down to company commanders in Afghanistan. The reason is because DCGS-A is a program that integrates all of the ends, and it also integrates with other agencies. For the first time, we have an intel system that—

Senator SHELBY. Does it integrate and analyze?

General ODIERNO. It does.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

General ODIERNO. Integrate and analyze—

Senator SHELBY. And disseminate.

General ODIERNO [continuing]. With the other agencies.

Senator SHELBY. Sure.

General ODIERNO. And with the bandwidth. So the one thing we are working on next is we were getting ready to go forward with moving it to the Cloud, and I am not going to get into the details because I am not smart enough, but I would tell you that we are in the process of doing that, which really tackles the bandwidth problem. So you will then be able to reach up and take data, and we are in the process of moving forward with that now. We have started, and in the next year-and-a-half or so, we are going to do that. The Army has dedicated itself across all of its IT systems that we are moving in that direction because it saves us lots of money, provides us more protection, as you just brought up, and will enable us to move forward.

Is the system a perfect system? No. But we have systems in place to constantly improve it, and I feel very comfortable with where we are going with this.

Senator SHELBY. It's important for the war fighter.

General ODIERNO. Absolutely.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Pryor.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to start, if I may, General Odierno, with the sexual assault in the Army. I know that the Army has a multi-tiered system to address sexual assault in its units, and I appreciate that. I just have a couple of questions, though.

How do you measure the effectiveness of unit victim advocates not so much at the 30,000-foot level but down at the lower levels? How do you measure the effectiveness there?

General ODIERNO. Well, that's a very difficult question. But there are a couple of things that I talk about to my commanders, and they have to be able to see themselves, and you have to have processes in place that allow you to see what impact the chain of command and sexual assault coordinators are having.

Senator PRYOR. And do you feel like you have that?

General ODIERNO. Well, we are working that now. So it's things like constant assessments such as command climate surveys and other things like that, and sensing sessions where they get a feel for do people feel comfortable to come forward, do they feel the process is in place that they feel protected, do they feel comfortable that their rights are being protected, that we are protecting the victim?

We have had significant conversation about this over the last several months. We are moving in the right direction. We are certainly not there yet. But those are the kinds of things we absolutely have to do as we move forward, and then it gets to victim advocates. So the Secretary and I are reviewing what do we do about victim advocates. Those are separate from these coordinators. I see them coordinating training, coordinating programs. How do we establish a victim advocate capability at every one of our installations where immediately they are working with our young men and women who make an accusation on sexual assault?

So it's those kinds of things that I think will help us to get to what you are asking us, Senator.

Senator PRYOR. So it sounds like you are committed to getting this right?

General ODIERNO. Absolutely.

Senator PRYOR. And let me ask this. I know you are talking about, at least when I hear you, I think, mostly Active Duty. But what about Reserve and Guard components? Does that create a separate set of issues?

General ODIERNO. It's different. It's more difficult because of when they are not on Active Duty or not in training. And so it's about us establishing capabilities that enable them to reach out. For example, we're trying to establish Web sites and other things where people can reach out. When they are so spread out in their civilian jobs, how can they notify us or contact us? How do we better reach out to those in the Army Reserve and the National Guard? So it's a little bit different. The tenets are the same, but it's more difficult. So we are working very hard to take a look at that.

Senator PRYOR. And there again you are committed to trying to get that right, as well?

General ODIERNO. Absolutely.

Senator PRYOR. Understanding the differences.

General ODIERNO. Yes.

ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX

Senator PRYOR. All right. Let me change gears and ask about the Reserve forces. This is a long title. I apologize. But in December of 2012, the Reserve Forces Policy Board released a study titled, "Eliminating Major Gaps in DOD Data on the Fully Burdened and Lifecycle Costs of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should Be

Mandated By Policy.” Are you familiar with that study? It came out in December 2012.

General ODIERNO. I am familiar with the study.

Senator PRYOR. One of the things it talks about is basically at certain times, when they are not activated, the Reserve component cost is less than a third of the active-duty component counterpart. You understand that. So the question is: Is the Army using the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) study to determine the corrective Active versus Reserve mix? Are you all using that study?

General ODIERNO. Sure. Well, first, I don’t need the study because I understand what the costs are already. So to me, this is not about costs. It’s about costs plus capability plus our requirements. So I am a firm advocate that there is a reason why we have a total Army. There is a reason why we have an Active component. There is a reason why we have a National Guard. There is a reason why we have a U.S. Army Reserve. We need all three components, and we have proved that over the last 12 years, why we need them.

Yes, they cost a third of the Active component, but they are not as ready. They don’t meet certain criteria you want Active component people to meet. But they provide us capabilities that we don’t have in the Active component. They provide us capabilities, some unique capabilities. They provide us depth. They provide us the capability to operate in extended war fights, et cetera. So it’s a combination of both.

So what I tell everyone is we are looking at that right combination of what we need, and that’s why, in the Budget Control Act, all of the end strength came out of the Active component. We reduced it by 80,000. And as we come forward, if we have to go through sequestration, you’ll see that we take much more out of the Active component than we will the Reserve component, and there’s a reason for that.

But in my mind, you cross a line, and I need a certain number of Active component. We cannot cross that line. It is not one or the other. You need the combination of both to be successful.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Senator PRYOR. Let me also change gears and ask either one of you. In fact, why don’t I ask Secretary McHugh on this. I want to ask about the Army organic industrial base, i.e. arsenals and things like that. I hate to bring this up, but DOD was supposed to have reported back to Congress on February 28, 2013. They have had some extensions on a report to kind of let us know about our capabilities and capacities and kind of help us set some policy here.

But has the Army made a recommendation to the DOD on arsenal workload levels to retain critical manufacturing capabilities?

Secretary MCHUGH. To your exact question, not to my knowledge. We have done a lot of work with DOD with respect to the need to preserve an appropriate work input or throughput with the arsenals, as well as the depots. But unlike depots, where under law we have a required assignment of work, the arsenals are harder to attribute to those kinds of categories.

Nevertheless, through the work of DOD and their sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis, S2T2, and some of the things that we

have already launched in the Army, we are trying to do any number of things to ensure that our arsenals have a sustainable throughput, especially enough to sustain those high-skilled jobs that are so hard to replace.

One of the biggest challenges as we look across this fiscal landscape and all the kinds of things we discussed here already this morning, from the current sequestration to the potential of future sequestrations to the continuing resolutions that we have operated under, 15 of them since 2010, is that it hinders our ability to both assess and effect responses to our organic industrial base, both from the depot as well as the arsenal side.

But we, above all others, value these installations, and we're going to have and will continue to work very hard to make sure, through foreign military sales and other things, that we are doing everything to sustain them.

Senator PRYOR. I would like to continue to work with you to make sure we get the right workload there and keep that capability.

Secretary MCHUGH. Absolutely.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General, first let me begin by thanking you both for your extraordinary service to our country.

BUDGET SHORTFALL

Mr. Secretary, in your statement for the record and as you testified today, you stated that sequestration created a significant shortfall in the Army's budget, including nearly \$5.5 billion in the operation and maintenance accounts, and there is no doubt that the impact of these budget shortfalls are serious and unacceptable.

It's worth noting and emphasizing, however, that the Army faces a shortfall of up to \$8.3 billion in overseas contingency operations funding as a result of higher than anticipated war costs. In other words, the shortfall in the OCO account is more than the amount that has been caused by sequestration, if I understand your testimony correctly. And it seems to me that if unanticipated war costs, which are very difficult to estimate, particularly in the kind of environment that we are in right now, accounts for more than the Army's entire sequestration shortfall, that we need to address the portion of the fiscal year 2013 budget shortfall with some sort of supplemental OCO request.

So my question to you is have you requested a supplemental from Secretary Hagel or the Comptroller Hale to cover the shortfall that has resulted because of unanticipated war costs?

Secretary MCHUGH. Just last Friday, the Department delivered to the Hill—and it's a large request. It is nearly an \$80 billion programming request for 2014 that will, in part, we hope, accommodate some of these shortfalls we are facing here in 2013. And to address those that we are facing here in 2013, they also submitted last Friday a reprogramming request for this year. The Army, of that \$8.3 billion you discussed and that I mentioned in my opening comments, would have about \$5 billion of that reprogramming to help us to cover that. So it is not technically a supplemental re-

quest. But both in terms of the 2014 OCO and the 2013 reprogramming request, it will go a long way towards solving our problem.

My understanding is, in testimony before Congress a few weeks ago, Secretary Hagel has left open the question of a possible later supplemental request. But as to this point, I'm not aware that a decision has been made in that one area.

Senator COLLINS. General.

General ODIERNO. So, Senator, with the math that the Secretary just did, we have a \$3.3 billion shortfall right now. We are taking a risk right now with that \$3.3 billion. So what we have had discussions about, as the Secretary just said, is that if this continues, we might have to come forward and ask for some help in 30 or 35 days or so if we can't mitigate it in other ways. We have had initial discussions with Secretary Hale, and as the Secretary said, he has left the door open for a potential request.

So we have talked about this. We want to make sure we need the money. We think we are going to. We want to see it play out. For example, the locks have now opened in Pakistan, so that reduced costs. So we're trying to make sure before we ask that we absolutely need the money. But we're going to have to come forward soon if we don't see some improvement.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a really important point, that some significant shortfalls are not the result of sequestration but they are the result of unanticipated war costs, and I think we need to deal with both. I don't think unanticipated war costs should cause us to rob the underlying Army budget, and I fear that's what has happened, and it is a huge amount. It is more than the amount of sequestration. Let me just be very clear. I think sequestration is also a huge problem that we need to deal with, but we also need to deal with that.

CRIMINAL ACT PUNISHMENT STANDARDS

Let me just briefly switch to a different issue. It has now been approximately three-and-a-half years since the shooting at Fort Hood that led to Major Hasan being charged with killing 13 soldiers and civilians, and injuring dozens more. In the 42 months since that attack, and it was a terrorist attack, Major Hasan has continued to receive approximately \$6,500 per month in base pay, totaling more than \$292,000.

There is a difference between the way a civilian Defense Department employee is treated in such circumstances and a military servicemember. All of us, because of the epidemic of sexual assault, have become very attuned to differences in the civilian versus the military system, and if Major Hasan had been a civilian employee of the Department of Defense, the Army could have suspended his pay in just 7 days because the personnel rules for civilian Government workers allow for indefinite suspensions of pay in cases "where the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the employee has committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed."

Why do we have a different standard for Defense Department civilian employees who are accused of a serious crime than we do for servicemembers who may be accused of exactly the same crime?

Secretary MCHUGH. In these kinds of very emotional issues, as Secretary it is hard for me not to editorialize and let my emotions get in my way. So I will provide you the legal answer, and that is with respect to the military and the case in point, Major Hasan, is the Uniform Code of Military Justice, set by law, requires he be treated and continue to be paid until such time as his case is disposed of and his status in the military is resolved.

Senator COLLINS. Do you think that there should be a difference between the way a civilian Defense Department employee would be treated when it comes to being charged with a serious crime versus a military employee when it comes to the pay issue?

Secretary MCHUGH. I think everyone should be subjected to the presumption of innocence. I didn't write that particular provision of the Code, but I assume that is the underlying provision with respect to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the payment issues that you raised. I would hope that, even though personnel administrators and commanders may have the authority under law, that we would provide civilian employees the same presumption, to the extent it is appropriate.

Senator COLLINS. That's what bothers me. I don't understand the difference in treatment. If both continue to receive their pay because of the presumption of innocence, I would understand that. But I don't understand the disparate treatment.

Secretary MCHUGH. Senator, I am not an attorney, and I don't want to get either myself or the Army in trouble. I suspect it is that in the military, we have ways by which we can isolate people who have been accused, keep them, in essence, segregated from the workforce, and therefore, we are allowed to extend them that treatment and that presumption of innocence in that way. In the civilian sector, we don't have those authorities, and this isn't, by the way, just the Army. This is any Federal agency.

Senator COLLINS. I understand.

Secretary MCHUGH. And therefore, you are allowed to remove them from the workplace. I also assume that if the law were followed to his extent, that if that civilian employee of the Federal Government were later proven to be innocent, that they would have to take remediative steps with respect to their Federal employment.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Murray.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you both know, Senator Ayotte and I introduced the Combating Military Sexual Assault Act earlier this month. This bill is very important. It's going to help provide services to fight this sexual assault epidemic and help provide the about 26,000 servicemembers who were sexually assaulted last year with the support they need.

But to me, especially troubling are the recent cases at Fort Hood and Fort Campbell, where soldiers were placed into positions of trust, and they were dealing with victims of horrendous crimes. They should be absolutely the last people in those positions. And

in the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) report that was released on May 8, the Army pointed to its Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Prevention (SHARP) program as key to changing a culture that allows sexual assault. When we see this kind of behavior by soldiers who are administering the SHARP, how much faith should we all have that this is going to come about with the cultural transformations that are so badly needed?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, Senator, I want to assure you, as I stated, tried to convey in my opening remarks, we share your concern and disgust, particularly at the kinds of cases that you've mentioned. In an earlier response, I noted that I don't think we have taken the right approach to picking people who we expect to protect others, whether it be a victims' advocate or a SARC.

Senator MURRAY. How were they picked?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we expect commanders to pick people who are appropriate for the job, who have the record to fill that position adequately. We do not have a military occupational specialty for these, and that's part of the problem in terms of—

Senator MURRAY. It was like it was a throw-away position, you know?

Secretary MCHUGH. I'm sorry?

Senator MURRAY. It seemed to me like it was just a throw-away position, just pick somebody to do this.

Secretary MCHUGH. I hope that's not true, but we are taking steps, and I've signed a number of directives already to ensure that it isn't true. The Chief and I sent out a letter to all commanders just a few days ago saying that we are intending to hold them accountable for not just picking someone for these very important positions who are available, but also we expect them to pick the very best.

The other part of that is to provide some sort of recognition for people who take that job, like we do for other jobs in the military, who serve honorably, who do a great job, perhaps some consideration on promotion points or some other kinds of appropriate military recognition. Without those kinds of incentives, if people don't feel that the jobs are important, they're not likely to bring the kinds of assets and attributes that we wish.

The other thing I'm not satisfied with is the structure of the background checks.

Senator MURRAY. The screening.

Secretary MCHUGH. I don't think we go far enough.

Senator MURRAY. Are we going to?

Secretary MCHUGH. I will sign a directive, as I mentioned earlier, this week that will dramatically expand the criminal records checks that we go through for these people, and beyond that I am going to require a behavioral health screening, something that isn't provided right now. I think it's essential.

Senator MURRAY. When will that take effect?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I haven't signed the directive yet, and we're hopeful this summer. The problem is putting the process into place, respecting Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), making the information available to commanders, and making sure we have the behavioral health professionals to do the screening. As you know from your experience and your leader-

ship up at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), those cadre of personnel are one of our least structured, are most in demand. So I don't want to give a directive that is doomed to fail, but certainly by mid-summer we should have that under way.

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could just add, last week I did a worldwide VTC with every commander to talk about this very specific thing, and I asked them to do an informal rescreening of every SARC until the Secretary's directive could come out, and they have gone back. They are doing that now and they are reporting back to me that they have done at least another informal screening. We're hoping that will help until we can get the directive out so we can do this.

We have made it very clear how important these positions are. We might not have done that in the beginning, and maybe we should have. But there are things we can do, and the Secretary mentioned some of them, and I told him we are going to do this. We can give guidance to promotion boards. We can give guidance to how important we believe these positions—they should be the best people. I have put out guidance that says this is now our number one mission.

Senator MURRAY. Does each and every commander understand that these crimes will not be tolerated?

General ODIERNO. They do, they absolutely do. I am confident that they do understand that.

Senator MURRAY. Will they be held accountable for them?

General ODIERNO. They will, and if we have those who don't want to get with the program, we will take action to make sure they no longer have the authorities.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. I mean, I've been at these hearings many times, and obviously the people sitting in front of us understand this. This clearly is a cultural issue. It needs to be understood all the way down that it will not be tolerated, and I expect all of you to follow through on that.

Secretary MCHUGH. You have our promise, Senator.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH

Senator MURRAY. Okay. One other quick line of questioning. A year ago, both of you announced the launch of a comprehensive review of the Army's approach to behavioral health diagnoses and evaluations. This past February this review was completed, and its findings and recommendations were released in the corrective action plan, as you know. When we last talked about that, I had a number of questions about those recommendations and how they were going to be implemented and how they benefit soldiers and families, and I wanted to ask you today have they improved the experience of soldiers going through the process in terms of knowing where they are in that system and misdiagnosis concerns and appeals?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, starting with the latter part of it, which really, as you know better than anyone because you were a great leader in the effort, the misdiagnosis, the changing of diagnoses, and I think the frustration by those to whom that happened as to appeal rights, I don't want to say it has been totally fixed, because I never know what I don't know, but I think we've come

a long way, and certainly from the rule and regulatory perspective, as you are aware, we have totally eliminated the past practices that I think, perhaps with good intention but in our minds inappropriately caused diagnoses to be changed and soldiers to be out-processed under improper descriptions.

So I think that that whole effort—it was done in concert by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Under Secretary—helped us to come a long, long way, and we are doing much better. The behavioral health piece of the disability out-processing system is probably one of the better run. We continue to experience backlogs and a slowness of processing through the physical evaluation side of that, and we are continuing to work both at the Department of Defense (DOD) level and Veterans Affairs (VA) to make sure that we are not adding to the pain of these soldiers that in many cases have already suffered pretty terrible both seen and unseen wounds by some bureaucratic process that just doesn't respond to their needs.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. Well, I appreciate your continuing attention on that. I just wanted to ask you what you are learning from this, influencing the system-wide review that is going on under DOD?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, yes. I mean, we are conveying to Personnel and Readiness (P&R) at DOD all of our activities here. Obviously, they are deeply concerned about it. I know we have meetings with the other secretaries of the other services, and we always try to go to school on each other's lessons learned, and that is happening here. I don't want to tell you they are adopting all of our same protocols and procedures, but I think there is a commonality now that probably didn't exist before.

General ODIERNO. And I would just say that the Behavioral Health Task Force recommendations have been briefed. They understand what they are. They understand the actions that we've taken. We've been very clear to make sure that they understand all that, and we think it is influencing. I'm not saying it completely replicates, but it is certainly influencing it.

Senator MURRAY. All right, and I am out of time, but I would like an update on the quality assurance plan that is supposed to be developed, when you have an opportunity.

[The information follows:]

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013 (Public Law No. 112–23), section 524, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will develop a plan to standardize, assess, and monitor the Military Department quality assurance programs for disability Medical Evaluation Boards (MEBs), Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs), and Physical Evaluation Board Liaison Officers (PEBLOs). Congress established the following objectives for the Military Department quality assurance programs: (1) ensure accuracy and consistency in the determinations and decisions of MEBs and PEBs; and (2) monitor and sustain the proper performance of the duties of MEBs, PEBs, and PEBLOs. This report outlines the Department's plan to standardize, assess, and monitor the Military Department disability quality assurance programs.

This effort is led by the OSD Office of Warrior Care Policy. The Department of the Army has been an active participant in this effort, contributing detailed descriptions of our Quality Assurance (QA) methodology, quality control measures, and comprehensive training programs that have greatly informed the DOD QA Plan development process. The Army's robust QA processes, training programs and QA assessment tools have been offered as a model for standardization across the Department of Defense.

The OSD Office of Warrior Care Policy will submit a full report to Congress, as required by Public Law No. 112-23, section 524, in July 2013.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Senator.

I'd like to address a couple of quality-of-life issues. One of them was identified by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Holly Petraeus. She has noted, as others have, that it was about 7 years ago that we passed a law. I believe our colleague, Senator Talent from Missouri, was the author of this, and it addressed the Military Lending Act and capped the interest rate that could be charged to those in the Active military for loans.

It turned out at that time it was a serious problem. Many members of the military were getting deeply in debt, and many times with predatory lenders who were charging them exorbitant amounts in interest and the like. This not only affected their performance and their stress levels but their role in the military. If a soldier were deeply in debt, it may affect his ability to get a security clearance, for example. In the ultimate case, that soldier may be forced to leave the military after being trained and ready to give his life or a major career to it.

So we created this lending act and capped the interest rate at 36 percent. Well, it turns out it didn't work. The lending institutions have found ways around our law and are back to their old tricks, dragging many members of the military deeply in debt. I'm told—I haven't seen it personally, but what I've read is that as you approach many military bases around the United States, you find long rows of pawn shops and payday lenders and title loans and all the rest of these things that lure people in the military into debt, which might ultimately cost them their career.

Second to this is the whole question of the training of Active military and their families for education courses and other courses that they can take while in the military. There are over 300,000 in the Army who currently are taking advantage of these. More than half of these courses are being offered by for-profit schools. We have found in many other analyses that for-profit schools are extremely expensive and, secondarily, not very good. It ends up luring the military into deceiving courses at institutions with deceiving names, like the American Military University, which turns out to be nothing more than a for-profit front that produces very little by way of education, while that soldier and the family of the soldier use up whatever benefits they have for education and training, unaware that they are going to a sub-par operation.

Those two things seem to go right to the question of quality-of-life in the military. Secretary, have you run into either of those two?

Secretary MCHUGH. We absolutely have. I'm somewhat predisposed on the first issue you raised because I was the Personnel Subcommittee chairman on the Armed Services Committee in the other House when that came through, and some of the things that Holly Petraeus brought to us were real eye-openers. My recollection is, as yours, Senator Talent did lion's work on that and is something that I fully support.

Clearly, it continues to be a problem. Predatory lenders are something that we want to help every soldier and their family avoid. But every time a law is passed, we seem to be dealing with it in a new permutation. We certainly would be more than willing—we would be delighted to work with you and other Members of the Congress to see if there are ways in which we can limit that.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, we do try to offer education as part of our in-processing as to basic financial responsibility and offer it to our family programs, but soldiers, particularly over the last 12 years, have had a pretty full plate on training and they often understandably have other things on their minds. But to the extent we can refine that, we certainly want to do it.

As to the issue of for-profit schools, they have been a problem historically—not all of them, of course. I think their roots go into a pretty positive way, and that is online learning. It was a very convenient way for soldiers, particularly forward deployed, to continue to pursue their higher education needs, and that gave birth to many good but, as you noted, other not so good institutions who provide that.

I think we have come quite a ways. I think the major way in which we try to weed the good from the bad is through accreditation standards. We accept only national and academic accrediting institutions as occurs through private universities and colleges throughout this country. Also, just last month, I believe, the Department of Defense finalized its memorandum of understanding approach where every school that is going to receive tuition assistance dollars through the Army and the Department of Defense has to sign a memorandum of understanding that covers a whole host of requirements as to you have to open yourself up to inspections, you have to have certain standards of disclosure of your costs; meaning, to your point, full disclosure, like when you buy an automobile, what is this really going to cost me in the end, and other kinds of measures that I think will be helpful.

But as we've learned, people who are trying to take advantage of other people adapt very quickly, and this I suspect will be an ongoing challenge.

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could just—

Senator DURBIN. General.

General ODIERNO. I have a lot of experience with this issue, and none of it is very good experience. First, I meet with Holly Petraeus regularly. She was in about a month ago to lay out what she's found, many of the things you just talked about, and what she's working on now. And we also have her and her colleagues really talk to many of our leaders to discuss what they're finding.

We have predators, and they are predators on young soldiers. They tend to go after the brand-new soldiers and families. When they first show up at installations they grab them very quickly and they try to take advantage of them, specifically with high-percent-age loans and other things.

We have financial advisors in every battalion. Now, it is an additional duty, but they have been trained to give financial advice. We are worried because all of our families are used to having a bit more money because of all the deployments. As our deployments go away, they're going to have to get used to lower salaries because

of all the benefits they've been given for being deployed. So it is a concern of ours as we move forward that we might see more financial difficulties, especially with our younger soldiers. So this is something that I think we have to be very careful about.

I also would say with tuition assistance, which we believe is an incredibly important program, that we have many of these for-profit organizations taking advantage of maximizing the dollars they get from tuition assistance. So they're driving the costs up, and it's almost making it unaffordable for us. So we have to go after this problem. About 42 percent of all tuition assistance goes for for-profit universities in the Army. So this memorandum of understanding that the Secretary just mentioned is key to at least make sure they're accredited.

But I also think there are other ways we can do to reduce the cost as well as we manage the tuition assistance program. We think it's essential because we want our young men and women to improve themselves, but we've got to get it under control in terms of cost. I think there are going to be some things that we work on for 2014 specifically that will enable us to still provide this to our soldiers, but do it in a way where we are not what I would consider to be wasting some dollars as we do it.

Senator DURBIN. That's really good to hear, and I want to work with you on this. We should have a higher concern over the impact on military and their families. That should be the starting point here. Clearly, there is a larger issue to America at large in terms of the same exposure to the same exploitation. But if we can make the case in the military, and I think we can, then I hope that it will lead us to make reforms in some other areas as well.

Senator Cochran.

BUDGET SHORTFALLS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I think from the testimony we've heard today, it appears that supplemental funding is needed to cover shortfalls for ongoing operations in Afghanistan.

General Odierno, we would appreciate your providing the committee a list of such shortfalls for the hearing record.

General ODIERNO. We will do that, Senator.

[The information follows:]

The Army has experienced higher Operation and Maintenance (OMA) Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) costs than initially projected over the course of the fiscal year. These shortfalls initially approached nearly \$10 billion and Army has worked diligently to reduce the shortfall, which currently stands at \$8.3 billion. Continuous reviews with ARCENT update the status of requirements as the year progresses. The reason for the increase from \$7.8 billion to \$8.3 billion is primarily due to Strategic Lift requirements internal to the ARCENT Theater of Operations. Components of the unfunded requirements are:

[In thousands of dollars]

Activity	Current UFR
LOGCAP	1,483,725
Stock fund	1,607,835
Non-stock fund	1,498,000
In-theater maintenance [ITM]	791,675
Subsistence for civilians	145,000
Premium transportation	234,000
TACSWACAA	200,558

[In thousands of dollars]

Activity	Current UFR
160th Signal BDE	43,973
Second destination transportation	1,385,920
Subtotal	7,390,686
CLS ISR BA4 capability support	285,500
Subtotal	7,676,186
STRATLIFT	600,000
OMA OCO Total	8,276,186

As of: 6 May 2013

Activity Details

Theater Operations (LOGCAP, Stock Fund, Non-Stock Fund, In-Theater Maintenance).—Fuel, repair parts, and other supplies for units continue to be consumed at a high rate, in correlation with active combat operations. While USFOR-A has closed a considerable number of FOBs and COBs, a significant number remains, including the large hubs in Kabul and Kandahar which account for the majority of the LOGCAP and local service contract costs.

Subsistence and Premium Transportation.—Army is responsible to fund subsistence and the transportation of subsistence items for all servicemembers, DOD Civilians and Contract personnel in Theater. The number of civilians and contractors currently in Theater exceeds the projected President's budget 2013 level developed last year.

Total Army Communications Southwest Asia, Central Asia (TACSWACAA)/160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support.—These programs provide a robust strategic communications capability in the Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). 160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support provides all combat and combat support forces communication engineering/logistics/security support. TACSWACAA provides the tactical ability to perform command and control (C2), requisition of repair parts/supplies, and transportation operations in-theater. These programs rely on contractors to reduce the deployment (potentially a brigade-size element) of Signal Corps Soldiers.

Second Destination Transportation (SDT).—While the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication (PAK GLOC) is open, it has yet to achieve its pre-closure rates. 20 percent of the export cargo shipped for the month of April flowed along the PAK GLOC. As it continues to mature, we anticipate approximately 55 percent of export cargo will move on it. The remaining export cargo will flow along the other three routes, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), multimodal, and direct air, which will balance the goals of cost avoidance and risk reduction by maintaining viable retrograde options. The PAK GLOC is fragile in terms of opening/closing due to political and military events. If it is closed again for some reason or does not achieve the desired level of throughput, the Army will have to increase its use of the other more expensive routes.

Contract Logistics Support (CLS) ISR, PGSS/VADER.—Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) is a stand-alone tethered aerostat well-suited for small to medium-sized sites. PGSS provides radar systems to cue aerostat payloads providing near real-time eyes on target. PGSS also provides a communications platform for EPLRS/SINCGARS. Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) allows accurate Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery readily available to ground commanders. The antenna is designed to support multiple missions, including the capability to detect dismounts and facilitate the exploitation of this data.

Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT).—STRATLIFT supports deployment and redeployment of Soldiers and Equipment to the CENTCOM AOR, including the intra-theater movement and shipments associated with MRAP shipments to Theater.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Shelby.

FORT HOOD SHOOTING INCIDENT

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, I'm going to the Fort Hood incident now that Senator Collins brought up. That's in its fourth year. It's been over 3 years, starting in the fourth year, since the shooting occurred.

Secretary MCHUGH. It was in the fall of 2009, sir, yes.

Senator SHELBY. What's the status of this? You know, this is troubling to me and others. We've heard it all our life: Justice delayed is oftentimes justice denied. And this person, I'm sure he's presumed to be guilty—I mean presumed to be innocent under his rights. But on the other hand, I often wonder, when you delay, I wonder if at times—and I hope not—that the prosecution is not out-gunned by the civilian lawyers, you know the lawyers, whoever they are for him, because you put this case off and you delay it and you delay it and you delay it, and as we all know, it's not in the news.

And I think about the victims there, and I think about what I call a dastardly deed. What's the status of that? We're into the fifth year, I believe.

Secretary MCHUGH. As I said, the alleged crimes occurred in the fall of 2009, shortly after I became Secretary.

Senator SHELBY. We know. I'm not blaming you or anything.

Secretary MCHUGH. No, no, no.

Senator SHELBY. I'm just curious about—you know, this is troubling.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, it's frustrating, and I'm sure it is to most, if not all, as you noted, of the victims and, of course, their families, who are—

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely, the victims.

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. Interested in seeing justice done. Unfortunately—and I don't know as we're much different in the Army, in the military here than in civilian cases—there are means by which trials are delayed. Some seem appropriate, some others less so. The defense—and I don't want to characterize—

Senator SHELBY. Sure. You can't.

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. The reasons for all of the delays, but the defense has been provided, at its request, opportunities to do some things and delays and such. The current schedule calls, I believe, for the actual jury selection and trial to begin this summer, 1 July they tell me now. However, just to cast it in a realistic light, we've had set dates before that seem to move to the right. But for the moment, that's when the court case is set to begin.

Senator SHELBY. I know you can't accelerate it or delay it or any of that. But as you said, you used the word "frustration." It's bothering, that length. There are not many murder trials in civilian courts delayed 4 years. You know, you have expeditious—you've got a speedy trial.

Secretary MCHUGH. Part of it was also the delay caused by the medical condition of the accused.

Senator SHELBY. Sure.

Secretary MCHUGH. But I understand fully your concern.

Senator SHELBY. I hope justice will be done.

General, do you have any comment?

General ODIERNO. I would just say I agree with your assessment that—you know, I worry about, as we wait for this to go through—

Senator SHELBY. Out of sight.

General ODIERNO [continuing]. It has to do with morale, discipline, it has some impact on that, to get it done. Again, I'm not a lawyer, but I believe also the fact that we're seeking the death penalty is a reason for the extended piece of this because of what goes on when you go after the death penalty. So I think that's part of what this is about, as well.

APACHE PROCUREMENT

Senator SHELBY. Shifting to something else, is the basic delay on the purchase of the latest edition of the Apache helicopter from 48 to 42, is that basically a lack of funds?

General ODIERNO. That has everything to do with a lack of funds.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

General ODIERNO. We had to make some choices. Unfortunately, that's one that we had to make.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Blunt.

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman.

I got here a little bit late. I don't want to have you repeat a lot of things you have already discussed, and I may have some questions for the record. But two things that relate specifically to conversations I'm having with people in Missouri.

CYBER CAPABILITIES

One, General Odierno, is we're talking to General Danner at the National Guard, the cyber unit that they have is really linking up consistently with critical infrastructure and in virtually every case is somebody in the National Guard cyber unit that then goes to work at their other job and they work in IT, and I've been talking to General Alexander some about what we could do with Cyber Commando to take more advantage of people who are out there every day being paid by somebody else to keep up to date on IT. I think one of the estimates is we're maybe 8,000 people short of where we need to be, and how do we get those people. But I wonder if you have any thoughts about that.

General ODIERNO. I do. We are moving—General Alexander now has provided the services, the capabilities he thinks he needs to execute our cyber strategy at the national level. The Army also has requirements at the operational tactical level.

We are building a structure that will take advantage—it will be a combination structure that will be in the Active and the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve structure that will mirror each other, which will give us significant capability to support General Alexander at the national level, and also help us at the operational tactical, because we want to take advantage of exactly what you just said, Senator. We think the National Guard and the Army Reserve can provide us a significant capability here, and faster than

we probably can in recruiting people to come on Active Duty or Department of the Army civilian.

So we are in the process of putting together our organization. We're going to lay out an extensive plan, and I guarantee you, you will see a plan where the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve mirror and leverage the unique qualities and capabilities that they can bring as we support General Alexander's plan from the national perspective, but also the Army plans for the operational and tactical side of operations in the future.

Senator BLUNT. I said I think it's a place where the private sector synergy is incredibly beneficial. I mean, years ago, when I was Secretary of State in Missouri, the securities commissioner worked for me, so we regulated the securities industry at the State level, and my view always was no matter who I hired, that was an area that was changing so quickly that 6 months later they probably weren't quite as good as the day I brought them in unless we constantly interacted with people out there, and here you've got a chance to do so much of that.

General ODIERNO. One of the things that we're—training and doctrine are looking at is what we call the Appeal, which is looking at everything to do with cyber, and one of the things is our training capabilities and do we make it a specific, now, specialty in the Army. And so if we go about doing that, it's to get at exactly what you're talking about so we can keep people up-to-date—

Senator BLUNT. Right.

General ODIERNO [continuing]. On the latest technologies, the latest capabilities.

So we are focused on that, and I expect that we're going to come out in the next 3 to 4 months with a full strategy on how we're going to execute this. We are obviously doing some things now. We have some capability in the National Guard. We have some capability in the Active component. But we're going to come out with an extensive plan on how we're going to lay this out throughout the force.

TRAINING AT FORT LEONARDWOOD

Senator BLUNT. And, Secretary McHugh, I had about 20 people in my office yesterday from Fort Leonard Wood, who were really pleased that you were there just a few days ago, and they were some of the people that you spent time with while you were there, and obviously everybody is concerned about impact on their community and bases. In a fort like that, that's surrounded largely by national forest, which is a good thing in terms of training opportunities, but it means that the economy, the impact on the economy of an installation like that is greater than it might be if it was in a more urban commercial area, and they're concerned about that. And then both that and proportionality are a couple of the things I hope you're looking at as you look at the difficult task you have in front of you.

FORCE STRUCTURE/STATIONING CHANGES

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, the folks both inside the gate and outside the gate were just great to us, and I felt right at home because, as you know, Senator, I come from a highly rural part of

America as well, and it reminded me a lot of home, so it was a great visit.

The thing that really impressed me, as you and I have discussed in the past, was the range of training that occurs there, and we've talked a lot about with young soldiers coming in and older soldiers getting better. But you've got the Military Police (MP) school there. You've got a sapper. You've got all kinds of great activities that I think will always be an important part of the Army. We've made considerable investments in that facility, and those are the kinds of things, as you noted, that as we make these hard decisions we'll consider very, very carefully.

You know, we're working through these determinations and probably will have some decisions to announce within a month or so. But I think everyone should be aware, given the breadth of what we're required to do because of the Budget Control Act, let alone sequestration, but simply because of the Budget Control Act, virtually every post, camp and station will feel some impact. So our job is to make the best possible decisions both for the Army, of course, and the taxpayer, but also for those bases that have stood tall and done great things, of which Fort Leonard Wood is certainly one.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator BLUNT. Right. Well, I recognize the challenge of the timing here, but our job, the job that the Chairman is going to lead us through, is probably benefitted by knowing as much as we can about the directions we're headed before we begin to allocate resources in this appropriations effort. I don't envy you, the job you have to do, or the job we have to do, but it's something we're going to have to deal with.

Thank you, Chairman.

Senator DURBIN. Thanks for your service and your testimony.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. JOHN M. McHUGH

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL

Question. Secretary McHugh, with sequestration and the ongoing drawdown in Iraq, I am very concerned about the effects on our defense industrial base. For instance, the Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) in Illinois is home to the Joint Manufacturing Technology Center, the only foundry operated by the Army. It is a full-service, cutting-edge facility with a diverse array of competencies, including forging, machining and friction stir welding.

However, as at other arsenals and depots across the country, a lack of workload threatens the ability to maintain critical capabilities and establish public/private partnerships—ultimately affecting military readiness and local economies.

I know the Army Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan—per congressional directive—is near completion and will help map a way forward, but how concerned are you about this and what are your thoughts on the best way to maintain our defense industrial base?

Answer. The Army is deeply concerned about the industrial base and our ability to retain needed skills and capabilities. Support for the Army Organic Industrial Base (AOIB) remains a priority for the Army as we execute the Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan signed last year on October 15, 2012. The Army developed, and

is in the process of implementing the AOIB Strategic Plan. The AOIB Strategic Plan provides the roadmap and management framework to ensure the AOIB remains viable, effective, and efficient. In addition, the AOIB Strategic Plan focuses on identifying critical risk areas and establishes a common framework to develop mitigation strategies to sustain critical capabilities and suppliers.

Rock Island Arsenal is a strategic part of the defense industrial base and has several manufacturing capabilities and skill sets. The Defense Logistics Agency considers the Arsenal a source of manufacturing supplies and materiel. Some of these capabilities include: (1) Heat Treating—Foundry Operation; (2) Casting (Steel, Aluminum, Titanium); (3) Forging (Open and Closed Die, Impression); (4) Non-Destructive Testing (Radiographic, Magnetic Particle, Liquid Penetrant, Ultrasonic, X-Ray); (5) Welding and Fabrication (Laser, Water-Jet); and (6) Engineering and Laboratory Services.

The Army is ensuring the long-term health of facilities like Rock Island Arsenal within the AOIB by: (1) encouraging its organic facilities to enter into Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) with commercial firms to enhance organic capabilities and capacities to provide goods and services; and (2) identifying capabilities and capacities at organic facilities to ensure that workforces and infrastructures are aligned and sized properly, and remain a ready, responsive, and flexible source of support during future contingency operations.

Question. When do you expect the Army Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan, with its minimum arsenal-by-arsenal workload levels, to be released?

Answer. The Army Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan was signed by the Under Secretary of the Army on October 15, 2012. The Army report that includes minimum arsenal-by-arsenal workload levels (in Direct Labor Hours) will be provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June 2013.

HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE NEW PRODUCTION

Question. Secretary McHugh, the fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Bill provided \$100 million to begin a multiyear effort to modernize the aging high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet in the Army Guard. The committee has been made aware of overwhelming support within the Adjutant General community for procurement of new production vehicles with these funds, and I have included in the record two letters from the National Guard Association of the United States as well as the Adjutants General Association of the United States that reflect this widely held position. Please consider these views as you work with the Guard on equipment needs.

Answer. Thank you Senator. The Army is working closely with the Army National Guard and will strongly consider its views as we determine the best path forward to modernize the Guard's Light Tactical Vehicle fleet.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND SYSTEM

Question. Secretary McHugh, I have a question for the record about the Distributed Common Ground System. It relates to cost and your reporting to Congress on this program. In this budget environment, it is important that accounting for this program be accurate and that all costs be reported to Congress as well as Army leadership so that we can all make informed decisions.

On May 9, Dan Wagner in the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison responded to a letter about DCGS-A from the Council of Citizens Against Government Waste. That email from the Army stated that:

"The cost of the program is \$10.2 billion over the life cycle of the program (FY05–FY34). The \$28 billion quoted is not accurate because it includes the cost of training 58,000 intelligence soldiers no matter what system they are trained on. The costs are on par with other ACAT-I Major Defense Programs and we have incorporated efficiencies across the program."

It is our understanding that this particular section reference a capability production document (CPD) from 2011 which stated that the total costs of the program were \$28 billion. The Army is now briefing that the cost is \$10.2 billion and the difference in cost is justified in the email.

From a budget perspective, please answer the following questions: Is there a method of cost accounting that permits the omission of training dollars?

Answer. No. The official Army Cost Position (ACP) includes training costs as the process requires consideration of all life cycle costs related to developing, producing, fielding, and retiring a system. Finally, it is important to note that the estimated

cost to develop, procure, train and sustain the Distributed Common Ground System–A (DCGS–A) through 2034 is \$10.2 billion, as stated in the ACP developed on October 19, 2012. The \$28 billion figure referenced in your letter comes from the Cost Benefit Analysis supporting the Capability Production Document which included \$14 billion for Manpower Authorizations. The costs for training on the DCGS–A systems were included in both estimates. The costs for Soldier’s basic intelligence training for all potential users that were part of the military intelligence community were not included in the ACP. These costs are still budgeted by the Army but not allocated to specific systems. DCGS–A is just one of the systems that these individuals may operate.

Question. Does the Army brief all programs independent of training money?

Answer. No. Training money is included in the Army Cost Position for all Army programs. Training dollars that aren’t specific to the system, e.g., Soldier’s basic training, are excluded in certain affordability briefings because these costs are funded outside of the particular program.

Question. How do you account for congressional decisionmakers being briefed on different numbers than Army leadership and OSD?

Answer. Congress, the Army leadership, and OSD were all provided the Army Cost Position, which is the Army’s official estimate for the total life cycle cost of a program. The ACP is the predicate document used to prepare the Acquisition Program Baseline and the Major Automated Information System Annual Report to Congress.

Question. Could you provide a budget document that appropriately counts the training dollars in 5, 10, and 20-year windows?

Answer. Yes. The Army Cost Position (ACP) provides the total life cycle cost of a program (2005–2034). It includes the training cost by year. Training costs are included in the procurement funding for the program. The following table provides the training cost per year for the DCGS–A Increment 1 program.

[In million of dollars]

	Fiscal year								
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Training Funding	19.2	27.7	37.2	34.9	30.7	1.7	5.2	7.4	7.3

	Fiscal year								
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Training Funding	7.4	5.3	2.7	6.7	6.8	7.7	8.4	6.8	0.0

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET SHORTFALL

Question. After the Army exhausts its portion of the defense reprogramming authority, the Army will face a \$3.3 billion shortfall in its Overseas Contingency Operations budget.

Does this put our Soldiers in Afghanistan and in other places around the globe at risk?

Answer. Although we are still assessing the impacts of the fiscal year 2013 budget on readiness and training, deploying units remain the number one priority. Fiscal year 2013 budget uncertainty has delayed the Army’s ability to refocus the training of contingency forces on conventional threats and required the Army to accept risk in meeting force deployment timelines in Combatant Commander Operational Plans. Only units with high-priority missions are able to fully prepare. Lower priority units will not be able to fully execute broader-focused training strategies because they must constrain training activity to the squad/crew/team level. These forces will require additional time to prepare for an unforeseen contingency or will have to be deployed at less than full effectiveness, which will increase the risk. If units are deployed before being fully trained, operational commanders will have to use all available time to continue to prepare and assess whether mission requirements warrant the risks of force employment or offer alternatives. We continue to work with OSD on solutions to the Overseas Contingency Operations shortfall to mitigate these effects.

Question. What is the Army doing to mitigate this shortfall?

Answer. The Army is working diligently with the Department of Defense (DOD) to mitigate the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) shortfall. The Department recently submitted two reprogramming actions for fiscal year 2013 that use all the

OCO special transfer authority and all but \$200 million of general transfer authority for fiscal year 2013. Congressional approval of the reprogramming actions, as submitted, will help reduce Army's current OCO shortfall from \$8.3 billion to \$3.3 billion. The Army's OCO requirements for this reprogramming request are \$5 billion, of which \$4.2 billion comes from internal Army sources. The Army is continuing to work with United States Forces—Afghanistan and all other OCO stakeholders to reduce the remaining \$3.3 billion. To address the remaining OCO shortfall, we are exploring a Joint/DOD solution. Without a Joint solution or supplemental request, we would be forced to identify an internal Army solution creating extreme risk in fiscal year 2013/2014 readiness.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ROTATIONS

Question. The Army reports that it has cancelled between 6 and 10 Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations in response to the \$3.3 billion OCO shortfall. Outstanding training through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk ensures our Soldiers' readiness as they deploy to war, and it prepares them for unexpected military contingencies.

How will these cancellations impact our military's readiness over time?

Answer. Any unit that did not conduct a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation in fiscal year 2013 is not prepared to execute Decisive Action against Hybrid Threats in the event of a contingency mission. Unless significant additional funds are generated to retrain these units and recoup lost readiness, these same units will not be prepared to deploy until completion of the unit's next Force Generation cycle. Our CTC program not only serves as a culminating training event to build readiness for a broader range of missions, but it also provides a critical leader development experience for commanders and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) at all echelons. Curtailing CTC rotations mortgages the leader development of the force over the longer term.

Question. Since the Army has reduced the number of JRTC rotations in fiscal year 2013, will you try to increase the number of rotations in fiscal year 2014?

Answer. The Army is already planning to execute 10 Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations at JRTC in fiscal year 2014. With additional funding, the Army could execute one additional CTC rotation at that same center. If provided additional funds, we could execute three additional rotations—one at each Maneuver Combat Training Center (JRTC, NTC, and JMRC).

However, the Army is still assessing the effects of limiting non-assigned forces to squad/platoon level training. Given the low level of readiness at which units will enter fiscal year 2014, we need to ensure units have the time to build readiness in order to fully take advantage of a CTC event.

Question. How long will it take readiness to recover from the reduction in training?

Answer. Our analysis indicates that it will take the Army 2 years to return to the readiness levels we had prior to sequestration.

Ultimately the time required by non-deploying forces to restore readiness will depend largely on how far their readiness slips in fiscal year 2013 and beyond. The longer the Army is forced to operate within a fiscally constrained environment, the longer it will take readiness to fully recover. The Army is still working to meet fiscal year 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding requirements, a challenge made more manageable if Congress approves the reprogramming action submitted by the Department. Even if approved, the Army still faces a \$3.1 billion shortfall.

Full readiness by a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), for example, is achieved through a period of training beginning at homestation and culminating in a training event at a Combat Training Center (CTC). It takes approximately 1 year for a BCT to go through reset and train up to support unified land operations. Cuts to unit training budgets have curtailed this process for all but the highest priority units.

The required number of ready BCTs per year is approximately 15. The Army anticipates funding 13 rotations at the various CTCs in fiscal year 2014 (of these 13, 9 BCTs are deploying), and 20 rotations in fiscal year 2015. This means that from a training perspective, readiness should sufficiently recover in fiscal year 2016 if the Army is adequately funded in fiscal year 2014 and beyond. If, however, the fiscal environment in fiscal year 2014 is similar to fiscal year 2013, it will take even longer for Army readiness to recover.

NATIONAL GUARD—AVIATION

Question. What is the Army doing to ensure that sufficient upgraded air assets such as the Blackhawk helicopter remain with the National Guard to adequately respond to natural disasters?

Answer. In keeping with the Total Army Concept, the Army will maintain Black Hawk Helicopters in the Army National Guard (ARNG) while continuing to modernize its aircraft for sustained interoperability with the Active Component fleet.

Our plan to modernize the Army National Guard Black Hawk is a multi-tiered strategy which modernizes the current Black Hawk Fleet through new production HH/UH-60M aircraft (PB13 procures 31 H-60M for ARNG), through the UH-60A to UH-60L Recapitalization Program (RECAP, 48 ARNG H-60A aircraft in progress), and beginning in fiscal year 2018, through a cockpit digitization program for the Army's remaining H-60L Black Hawk aircraft fleet being retained.

Currently, the ARNG has 100 percent of their authorized 849 Blackhawk aircraft on-hand. Of the 849 Black Hawks, 45 percent are upgraded with an additional 5.6 percent in the H-60A to H-60L RECAP program. The ARNG currently has 78 H-60M and 303 H-60L aircraft on hand and will continue to receive H-60M and H-60L aircraft to equip the ARNG to their full requirement of 432 H-60M and 417 H-60L Digital aircraft.

ARNG aircraft transfers to other components that exceed 90 days are paid back according to the Secretary of Defense's pre-approved payback plan per Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1225.06 policy. Additionally, this policy serves as a safeguard to preserve sufficient quantities of aircraft within the ARNG to perform its title 32 responsibilities.

Additionally, the Army has funded the ARNG's full requirement of the UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) which is specifically designed for operation in permissive environments, such as for domestic natural disasters.

FORCE REDUCTIONS

Question. When will force reductions be announced?

Answer. The Army will reduce its force structure in order to achieve the fiscal reductions required by the Budget Control Act of 2011, consistent with the National Military Strategy. The Army announced its drawdown plan on June 25, 2013. If sequestration remains unaltered, the Army will be forced to consider further reductions in fiscal year 2014.

Question. When will we learn how the Army plans to restructure its Brigades?

Answer. Decisions on restructuring BCTs with an additional maneuver battalion, a brigade engineer battalion, and other design improvements were included with the force reductions announcement on 25 June 2013.

EXPLOSIONS

Question. We have had at least two explosions at Camp Minden due to the improper storage of explosive propellant. What is the Army prepared to do to assist in the proper disposition of the explosive material?

Answer. Explo Systems, Inc. owns and stores explosives under a lease with the Louisiana National Guard (LANG), at Camp Minden. The Secretary of the Army has authority to provide technical assistance, upon request, to assess the potential explosive hazards associated with stored explosives. From April 2-3 and May 6-9, 2013, the Army dispatched a team of explosives safety experts to Camp Minden to conduct a Technical Assistance Visit (TAV). Technical reports were provided to the Louisiana State Police (LASP) and LANG with findings and recommendations for their consideration. On May 20, 2013, the Adjutant General, LANG determined that the explosives had been in proper storage.

The first TAV assessed the potential explosive hazards associated with approximately 18 million pounds of M6 propellant that Explo stored at Camp Minden. The second TAV assessed the potential hazards associated with other explosives (approximately 2.5 million pounds) that Explo stored at Camp Minden. At LASP's and LANG's request, the second TAV provided recommendations for improving explosives safety and for the disposition of these explosives, to include the 15 million pounds of M6 remaining at Camp Minden. The TAV team also identified some explosives that posed an explosive hazard and recommended the LASP request follow-on technical assistance from the Army. LASP requested Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) provide this assistance and provide LASP approaches for handling and disposing of this material safely. EOD will provide this technical assistance by June 14, 2013.

LANG and LASP, in conjunction with other State and local authorities, are working to determine the actions to be taken with regard to the disposition of the Explo's explosives at Camp Minden. Upon request by these State agencies, further technical assistance may be provided.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. Does the scope of the Army's sexual assault program go beyond soldiers in uniforms to family members, and the Total Army community?

Answer. Yes, the Army's program includes the Total Army community. The Army's prevention and training program provides commands with training materials intended for Soldiers and Civilians, with corresponding annual training requirements for the Total Force.

For victim care, the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program provides care to all Soldiers and their family members 18 years or older who are eligible for treatment in the military healthcare system. Other Army programs care for victims of child abuse or sexual assaults perpetrated by a spouse or intimate partner.

Civilians and their families stationed overseas who are victims of sexual assault are eligible for treatment at a military treatment facility and assistance from a Victim Advocate. Civilians and their family members, however, are only eligible to file an unrestricted report.

U.S. citizen DOD contractor personnel, when they are authorized to accompany the Armed Forces in overseas contingencies, are eligible for treatment at a military treatment facility and assistance from a Victim Advocate. Contractors are also only eligible to file an unrestricted report.

Question. There has been a lot of discussion about sexual assault prevention policies at the most senior levels of the organization. Please discuss the unit victim advocate program at the lowest levels of the Army and whether you feel having unit victim advocates is working, or not.

Answer. Army policy mandates that battalion and equivalent sized units appoint two collateral-duty unit victim advocates (UVA). Commanders may appoint additional UVAs if necessary for very large battalions or units that are geographically dispersed. Anecdotal feedback from the field indicates that the current structure with the UVAs as a collateral duty works well for commands, giving them trained personnel that supplement and enhance the capabilities of full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) and SAPR Victim Advocates (VA) maintained at the brigade level. The Army is taking a hard look at the roles, responsibilities, and qualifications of the SARCs and VAs to ensure the optimal continuum of victim care from time of report through post-case disposition.

Question. What are the "metrics of success" to evaluate how some of these programs are working?

Answer. The definitive metric is the number of sexual assaults. However, given that sexual assault is the most under-reported crime in the Nation, this metric, by itself, can be misleading. Therefore, the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Prevention Strategy has corresponding goals to reduce sexual assault while increasing victims' propensity to report. Survey data indicates that female Soldier victims' propensity to report has increased to 42 percent in 2012 from approximately 28 percent in 2009.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK L. PRYOR

CRITICAL MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES

Question. Secretary McHugh, at the May 22, 2013 appropriations hearing you indicated that to the best of your knowledge the Army has not made a recommendation to the DOD on Arsenal workload levels to retain critical manufacturing capabilities. Given that the DOD is required to submit a report to Congress on the workload levels to retain critical manufacturing capabilities, will the Army make a recommendation based on the direct labor hours required, or a dollar value, similar to the depot "50-50 rule"?

Answer. As requested by Senate Report 112-73 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army identified: (1) critical manufacturing capabilities and capacities at the three Arsenals; and (2) the proper workload levels (in Direct Labor Hours) required to sustain these capabilities. The report was completed on May 7, 2013 by the Army Materiel Command, and it is currently under staffing to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It will be submitted to the Congressional Defense Committees later this summer.

Question. Secretary McHugh, the arsenal workload level to retain critical manufacturing capabilities does not guarantee that the arsenals will remain a cost effective solution for production. Will any recommendation the Army makes related to retaining critical manufacturing capabilities take into consideration the workload level required to remain cost effective?

Answer. The Army recognizes that identifying arsenal workload levels to retain critical manufacturing capabilities does not guarantee the arsenals will remain a cost effective solution for production. The Army is making recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the critical manufacturing capabilities residing at the arsenals and the proper workload levels (in Direct Labor Hours) required to keep these facilities operational. As requested by Senate Report 112-73 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army identified: (1) critical manufacturing capabilities and capacities at the three Arsenals; and (2) the proper workload levels (in Direct Labor Hours) required to sustain these capabilities. The report was completed on May 7, 2013 by the Army Materiel Command, and will be submitted to the Congressional Defense Committees later this summer.

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Question. Encouraging Public Private Partnerships is a significant element of the Army's strategy to strengthen the industrial base. Within the acquisition process, how is the Army encouraging Public Private Partnerships, and utilization of arsenal facilities and workforce?

Answer. The Army is encouraging Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the utilization of arsenal facilities and workforce as part of the acquisition process, to deal with some of the many challenges. PPPs are a significant element of the Army's strategy to strengthen the industrial base. They also sustain production lines and other systems, as well as the critical skill sets of our Nation's industrial artisans. In executing partnerships, the Army Industrial Base depots, arsenals, plants, and centers provide services that are either not available in the private sector or have demonstrated to be not cost-effective for private industry to provide. The Army is pursuing efforts to identify PPP opportunities in Acquisition Strategies and plans to fully leverage the power of partnerships to enhance and preserve Army's unique organic industrial facilities, processes, and personnel while offering private industry access to those capabilities for mutual benefit.

Currently, the Army is focused on implementing its Organic Industrial Base (OIB) strategic plan that promotes PPPs between the organic depots, arsenals and the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to develop complementary capabilities without incurring undue risk. Through these PPPs, workloads will be shared between the OIB facilities and OEM partners for the following purposes: (1) to ensure core depot logistics and arsenal manufacturing competencies are established and sustained at the selected organic Depots and Arsenals; (2) to share investments, reduce overall risks, and take advantage of best business practices that will benefit both the public and private sectors; (3) to reduce life cycle costs of weapon systems or stabilize labor rates at the OIB facilities (PPPs that share investment costs, promote the dual use and transfer of start-up equipment, and/or provide for the joint-use of facilities offer potential cost reductions); (4) to enhance the mission capability of the OIB industrial facilities; and (5) to create or maintain an industrial base capability.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

TERMINAL HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT TO GUAM

Question. Secretary McHugh, as part of the new Missile Defense deployment strategy, the Department of Defense decided to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Defense battery to Guam. Is the Army appropriately resourced in fiscal year 2013 and budgeted in 2014 to support this recent decision?

Answer. The deployment of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to Guam was not budgeted in fiscal year 2013, and the fiscal year 2014 budget submission likewise does not provide funding. The THAAD deployment cost in fiscal year 2013 is \$15 million, and we estimate the fiscal year 2014 cost to be at a minimum \$10 million. This un-forecasted requirement will be paid from readiness accounts, which were already stressed due to sequestration. The Army is still working to meet fiscal year 2013 Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding requirements, a challenge that will be made more manageable if Congress approves the reprogramming action submitted by the Department. Even if approved, we are still faced with

a \$3.1 billion OCO shortfall, which will put more pressure on our base-funded accounts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

Question. Secretary McHugh, in your testimony before this committee last year, you outlined the Army's plan to eliminate at least eight Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) due to the end of the Iraq War and the drawdown in Afghanistan.

What is the exact methodology involved in making the determination regarding which BCTs will be eliminated? For example, will a full range of an installation's assets, such as installation facilities, cost of operations and servicemember quality of life be factored into the methodology?

Answer. The Army realignment and stationing decisions are based on quantitative and qualitative factors that ensure that the Army is properly stationed at installations where it can best train and deploy to meet the Army's worldwide mission.

To begin its analysis, the Army uses the Military Value Analysis (MVA) model to evaluate five broad operational categories critical to Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) including: (1) Training; (2) power projection; (3) well-being; (4) mission expansion; and (5) geographic distribution. Within each category, the Army weighs a number of attributes. For example, in analyzing an installation's ability to support training, the Army considers available maneuver land, range sustainability, training facilities, indirect fire capabilities, and available airspace. Power projection considerations include an installation's deployment infrastructure, aerial port of embarkation and sea port of embarkation proximity. Factors that impact Soldier well-being include access to medical care, family housing availability, the general quality of life of an installation (e.g., access to Army Community Services, child care development centers, fitness centers, chapels, and youth centers), and the quality and quantity of brigade facilities and barracks. Mission expansion considerations include buildable acres, urban sprawl, and telecommunications infrastructure. Finally, we will look at geographic distribution by evaluating the dispersion of the Army's BCTs in order to support civil authorities for disaster response, minimize vulnerability to a catastrophic attack or natural disaster, and keep our all-volunteer force connected to the American people.

To ensure community input and understanding, the Army recently completed Community Listening Sessions at 30 installations to explain the process the Army is using to make these difficult decisions and to receive community input before any final decisions are made. The Army's brief detailed the operational categories contained in the MVA model as well as an overview of the qualitative factors outside the MVA model, to include strategic considerations, command and control proximity, costs and efficiencies, and readiness, environmental, and socioeconomic impacts.

Using the MVA model scores as a base, the Army applies the qualitative factors and support to National Defense Strategy to evaluate various courses of action in order to reach an optimal stationing solution that is both feasible and acceptable.

Question. What is the Army's schedule for implementing this plan?

Answer. BCT inactivations, if approved, would begin in fiscal year 2014 and continue through fiscal year 2017. However, if sequestration continues, it will be accelerated considerably.

RELOCATING LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT COURSE TO FORT KNOX

Question. Secretary McHugh, on December 4, 2012, I wrote Undersecretary of the Army, Dr. Joseph Westphal, regarding the potential relocation of the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) to Fort Knox under the U.S. Army Cadet Command and why I believe such a move would be prudent. Dr. Westphal—in his January 2, 2013 response—noted the benefits of relocating LDAC to Fort Knox, stating the move “. . . would simplify command and control, reduce redundancies, and create new efficiencies that would improve the effectiveness of our Reserve Officers' Training Course (ROTC) training.” In light of the benefits such a move would provide—and which Dr. Westphal highlights in his response—and the fact that I wrote the Army on this matter over 5 months ago.

Please provide me with information on: What is causing the delay in announcing this move?

Answer. A final decision has not yet been made to relocate LDAC. The Army is deliberately and thoroughly reviewing all stationing options to meet the Nation's needs in an era of reduced resources. LDAC is a major component of the U.S. Army Cadet command's training program, and we seek to ensure any potential moves are

consistent with our goal of improving the effectiveness of our Reserve Officers' Training Corps training.

Question. Please provide me with information on: When the Army plans to make its final announcement.

Answer. There is no projected date for the final decision on relocating the LDAC. The Army will make a decision on relocation when it has a better overall view of the final Army stationing decisions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

ARMY COMBAT UNIFORMS

Question. General Odierno, since 2002 the military services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying patterns and colors. The Army is now planning to replace the Army Combat Uniform with a new combat uniform. Why is this change necessary?

Answer. The Army continuously seeks improvements to the combat clothing worn by our warfighters. Our combat and materiel developers routinely assess capabilities desired, using periodic survey and lessons learned feedback from Soldiers and unit leaders, and evolving technological improvements to ensure the uniforms worn by our Soldiers in combat and in garrison are meeting the Army's needs.

The Army recently completed a comprehensive scientifically based Phase IV Camouflage study, which constituted the most extensive uniform camouflage study ever undertaken with extensive Soldier involvement. The Army designed a scientifically rigorous evaluation program, studying the performance of camouflage in a wide variety of terrains, vegetation, and times of day. Initial decisions and recommendations have been provided to senior Army leaders, and the Army is anticipating a final decision during first quarter of fiscal year 2014.

The Army's plan concerning camouflage patterns does not affect the materials, design, cut, functionality, or any other aspects of the current Army Combat Uniform which was introduced in 2004 and continues being used today in Afghanistan. The only change being considered is the color of the cloth used in the construction of the Army Combat Uniform. Camouflage is critical to concealment, and concealment requirements change with mission, climate and terrain of deployments. To fully utilize this key element of force protection, the Services must retain the flexibility to change camouflage to meet emergent operational demands. This is exemplified by the 2009 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense direction to develop a new camouflage pattern specific to the needs of units operating in Afghanistan. As a result of this directive, the Army developed and issued to deploying Soldiers the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern on the Army Combat Uniform, which significantly improved concealment for that theater.

Question. Have you coordinated with any of the other services on developing a joint uniform instead of continuing the costly trend of developing service-specific uniforms?

Answer. In response to section 352 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 111-84), the Army partnered with the other Services and approved common technical performance standards for all ground combat uniforms. The Joint Clothing and Textile Governance Board (JCTGB), which also includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency, approved the joint criteria for implementation across all Services. Through their work as part of the JCTGB, the Services actively coordinate and standardize, where appropriate, clothing and textile acquisition activity.

Question. How much has the Army spent since 2002 on these new uniforms?

Answer. Since fiscal year 2002, the Army has spent approximately \$9.7 million on researching, testing, and evaluating camouflage, as follows.

The Army spent \$2.63 million testing camouflage patterns in support of its decision to implement the Universal Camouflage Pattern.

In response to 2009 legislation directing the Army to provide a combat uniform with a camouflage pattern that was suited to the environment of Afghanistan, the Army undertook a four-phased program. In Phases I through III, the Army spent \$2.9 million in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 for test and evaluation of multiple camouflage patterns both in the United States and in Afghanistan. This effort resulted in the selection of the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern for those deployed to Afghanistan. Phase IV was conducted to determine a long-term camouflage approach for the Army that would result in suitable alternate camou-

flage pattern uniforms that would effectively conceal Soldiers in a variety of environments. The Army has spent \$4.2 million from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013 on the Phase IV effort.

Question. How much is in the fiscal year 2014 request for a new uniform?

Answer. No funds are requested in fiscal year 2014 for development and testing of a new uniform.

WARFIGHTER RESPIRATORY HEALTH RESEARCH

Question. General Odierno, how much is the Army currently spending annually on warfighter respiratory health research?

Answer. The projected Defense Health Program (DHP) budget request for fiscal year 2014 is \$1,400,000 for respiratory health research. Prior years contained some DHP core funds, Army core funds and Congressional Special Interest (CSI) funding for 1 year of the Military Burn Trauma Research as shown below:

RESPIRATORY HEALTH FUNDING BY SOURCE—PROGRAM

	Fiscal year				
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014 (requested/ programmed)
DHP Core—Joint Program Committee 5 Funding	\$2,262,000	\$1,232,000	\$1,288,000	\$655,000	\$1,400,000
Army Core—Military Operational Medicine Re- search Program Funding	1,975,000	2,997,000	1,006,000	828,000
CSI—Combat Casualty Care Research Program Funding	5,100,000

WARFIGHTER RESPIRATORY HEALTH RESEARCH

Question. Where does this fall in the order of priorities for Army medical research?

Answer. The research task area “Pulmonary Health in Deployed Environments” is ranked 9th among 20 jointly prioritized Defense Health Program Military Operational Medicine task areas.

Question. To what extent do respiratory diseases affect our deployed service members?

Answer. Issues of respiratory disease occur at a lower incidence than other military injuries. Epidemiology and clinical studies are evaluating the available data.

New onset asthma and other “respiratory symptoms” (persistent or recurring cough, shortness of breath, chronic bronchitis or emphysema) is 1.4–2 times more frequent in deployed Service members than in those who were not deployed. In a study of 46,000 Millennium Cohort participants, 10 percent of non-deployers and 14 percent of deployers reported new onset respiratory symptoms. Most of these cases do not seem to be severe. Only about 1 percent of respondents reported Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) in the Millennium Cohort regardless of deployment status.

Of the 17,000 respiratory disease cases coded in the Army’s electronic medical record system, AHLTA, (2005–2009), the vast majority are sleep disorders (53 percent) with the next ICD–9 category being asthma evaluation (41 percent). Of the 17,000 cases, there were about 1,000 severe diseases coded, mostly interstitial lung disease and COPD. There were only 4 confirmed cases of constrictive bronchiolitis. A potentially confounding issue for some epidemiological studies is that about 20 percent of recruits display some baseline clinical (spirometric) respiratory abnormality upon screening before deployment in contrast to about 4 percent who report a history of asthma.

HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE NEW PRODUCTION

Question. General Odierno, the fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Bill provided \$100 million to begin a multiyear effort to modernize the aging high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet in the Army Guard. The Committee has been made aware of overwhelming support within the Adjutant General community for procurement of new production vehicles with these funds, and I have included in the record two letters from the National Guard Association of the United States as well as the Adjutants General Association of the United States that reflect

this widely held position. Please consider these views as you work with the Guard on equipment needs.

Answer. Thank you Senator. The Army is working closely with the Army National Guard and will strongly consider its views as we determine the best path forward to modernize the Guard's Light Tactical Vehicle fleet.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

RAND CORPORATION—ARROYO CENTER

Question. General Odierno, the RAND Corporation is a non-profit research institution whose headquarters and largest facility is located in my state. As you know, they operate the Army's only federally Funded Research and Development Center, the Arroyo Center. I understand that due to the unintended effects of an Army-requested billing change combined with an automated budget process outside of Army's control, the fiscal year 2014 line item request for Arroyo was erroneously reduced by \$9.3 million below what it was supposed to have been. This erroneous decrement represents a 44-percent reduction below the intended request. If not fixed, this error would represent a substantial reduction below the current funding level which could jeopardize the Arroyo Center's ability to maintain the subject matter expertise required of it by the Army.

Is this assumption accurate? If so, will the Army seek to restore the funding to \$21.239 million for fiscal year 2014?

Answer. Yes, the Army will work to restore RAND Arroyo's funding to \$21.239 million for fiscal year 2014. Without congressional action to restore RAND's funding, Army will be forced to address the \$9.3 million shortfall during the year of execution within our existing transfer authorities. Army expects to do all it can to maintain the historical level of effort from RAND in fiscal year 2014. We would appreciate any help from the committee in this matter.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK L. PRYOR

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. General Odierno, specific to incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment, is the Army studying differences in command climate surveys results for units that are deployed versus units that are at home station?

Answer. The Army does not currently study the differences in command climate surveys between units at home station and those that are deployed; however, as the Army begins elevating the reporting of command climate surveys to the Division level, we will incorporate this analysis in our way ahead.

Question. General Odierno, is the Army finding a higher incidence of sexual assault while a unit is deployed? Is that being studied?

Answer. The rate of reported sexual assaults for deployed Soldiers has consistently been lower than that for the Army as a whole. In fiscal year 2012, the rate of reported sexual assaults per 1,000 Soldiers was 2.2 for the Army and 1.9 for CENTCOM area of responsibility. The data also shows that there has been an increase in deployed Soldiers' propensity to report, and it is now comparable to the overall Army rate.

Question. General Odierno, is there a specific period of time where the prevalence of sexual assault increases, i.e. pre-deployment, during deployment, within the first 90-day period following a deployment, etc.? Is that being studied?

Answer. Army does not specifically track prevalence of sexual assault pre- or post-deployment. However, the Army recognizes that deployment provides additional stresses on Soldiers. To help address this, annual unit level sexual assault awareness and pre- and post-deployment Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) training is mandatory.

RETROGRADE

Question. General Odierno, given the increase in cost to retrograde equipment out of Afghanistan as a result of increased reliance on the northern distribution network, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs, can you discuss the scope of the retrograde mission in Afghanistan in terms of volume of cargo, movement timelines, and costs?

Answer. As of May 2013, we have 1.3 million pieces of equipment in Afghanistan worth \$25 billion, of which we will retrograde approximately 734,000 pieces worth \$19 billion. Over the past month, retrograde times ranged from 65 to 160 days:

multi-modal 65 days; Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication 82 days; and Northern Distribution Network 160 days. We estimate the retrograde of Army equipment will cost between \$1.8 billion and \$3.2 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funding; however, a worst case scenario, in which all equipment must be flown from Afghanistan directly to the United States by military aircraft, could cost as much as \$6 billion.

Question. General Odierno, has the Army identified all equipment and property that require retrograde out of Afghanistan, and projected the cost?

Answer. Yes, the Army has a deliberate process to determine the retention and disposition of equipment currently on ground in Afghanistan. We will retrograde equipment to meet approved requirements. Conversely, we will divest excess equipment for which there is not a validated requirement. Of the 1.3 million pieces of equipment in Afghanistan worth \$25 billion, we will retrograde approximately 734,000 pieces worth \$19 billion at a cost between \$1.8 billion and \$3.2 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funding; however, a worst case scenario, in which all equipment must be flown from Afghanistan directly to the United States by military aircraft, could cost as much as \$6 billion.

Question. General Odierno, how is the lack of a status of forces agreement between Afghanistan and US/NATO forces affecting your ability to plan for retrograde operations?

Answer. The lack of a Status of Forces Agreement is not currently affecting the Army's ability to plan for retrograde operations. Current plans for retrograde, base closures/transfers, and materiel reduction are associated with the President's directive to reduce troops levels to 34,000 by 12 February 2014 and further reduce forces by December 2014. The current Military Technical Agreement from NATO and U.S. Diplomatic Note from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, which provide freedom of movement for retrograde operations, will expire on 31 December 2014, at which point the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement would present challenges to planning for any U.S. military presence remaining after 31 December 2014.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

TERMINAL HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT TO GUAM

Question. General Odierno, in the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the Department of Defense reduced the number of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries from nine to six. Considering today's evolving ballistic missile threats, is six still the correct number of THAAD batteries; is greater risk being accepted than originally planned?

Answer. The currently programmed six Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries (two operationally available) will not meet Combatant Command (COCOM) demand. Previously, The United States Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense assessed an operational requirement for nine THAAD batteries. In response to continued COCOM demand for THAAD capabilities, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) 10 April 2013 Resource Management Decision 700 Memorandum directed the Army, in coordination with the OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office, the Joint Staff, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the COCOMs, to conduct an analysis to determine the current requirements for additional THAAD batteries and associated interceptors. Results of that study are due in July 2013 and will inform future procurement decisions. In the interim, Army and the MDA are working closely to achieve additional capability. The Army has programmed the force structure for a seventh THAAD battery and the MDA is planning to include the equipment in its Program Objective Memorandum 15 submission. This will provide an increased capability to source COCOM demands and better maintain the health of the force.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator DURBIN. The Defense Subcommittee now stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 10:34 a.m., Wednesday, May 22, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]